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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that old controversies regarding the objects and methods of treaty 
interpretation have not been resolved by the coming into force of articles 31 and 32 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. The articles, it is argued, 
have not so much resolved previous debates between "schools" of interpretation, as 
obscured them under an apparently clear regime, while interpreters continue to 
adopt their own preferences. The paper describes the three main schools -
textualist, intentions of the parties, and teleological - and concludes none offers a 
satisfactory scheme by itself. It then examines the development of the Convention 
articles, and concludes they represented a compromise in which the drafters failed 
to resolve the key issue of the underlying purpose or object of interpretation. It then 
shows that an orthodox interpretation of the articles has developed, which assumes 
they embody the textualist position. The paper then discusses how this orthodoxy 
has been accepted by the majority of the International Court of Justice in the 1990s, 
but with significant dissent drawing on insights from especially an intentions of the 
parties approach. The paper then draws on insights from modem approaches to the 
interpretation of commercial contracts, to suggest that the best resolution of the 
"text versus intentions" dichotomy lies in accepting that establishing the actual 
intentions of parties is the purpose of interpretation, and that therefore an apparently 
clear text will be strong but not conclusive evidence of such intentions. The paper 
examines how this refinement would have helped to resolve difficult interpretations 
before the ICJ, and concludes that such an approach is both desirable and consistent 
with articles 31 and 32. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents pages, footnotes and bibliography 
comprises approximately 19,820 words. 
1 
I INTRODUCTION 
It might seem that controversy and uncertainty over the interpretation of 
treaties, which once provoked heated debates, into which even great legal 
writers ventured uneasily, 1 have now been dissipated. 0 ld doctrinal 
controversies on both the purposes and methods of interpretation have 
apparently been resolved by the codification of the law in articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.2 Even more importantly, the 
articles have repeatedly been accepted as reflecting customary international 
law.3 Given their deliberately non-detailed nature,4 the articles will not by 
themselves resolve every difficult interpretation; they do however appear to 
give us a clear regime within which to work to achieve resolution. 
It is submitted that in reality the controversies have not gone away. Recent 
decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) show that the Court still 
tends to divide on interpretation issues. This essay will argue in part that at least 
some of the division is traceable back to the old controversies about methods 
and, especially, purposes. Overall it is better to suggest that articles 31 and 32 
have temporarily obscured a debate, not resolved it. If any real consensus is to 
be achieved on the purpose of and correct approach to treaty interpretation, 
articles 31 and 32 will require re-examination, leading to a better appreciation 
of how they should be applied. 
The essay will examine the original controversy of the "schools": the ''textual", 
the "intentions of the parties", and the ''teleological" schools. Writers who have 
offered their own variants will also be considered. The analysis will show that 
1 Sir Ian Sinclair The Vienna Co11Vention on the Law of Treaties (Second Edition, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1984) 114; Lord McNair The Law of Treaties (Second Edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961) 364. 
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 UNTS 1155 I: 183232, 331 (Vienna 
Convention). 
3 Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya /Chad) 1994 ICJ 6, 21-22, 
para 41 ("Libya v Chad"); Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain)(Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 1995 ICJ 6, 18, 
para 33 (Qatar v Bahrain); Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) ICJ 
1999 para 21 http://www.icj.law.gla.ac.uk/icjwww /idocket/ibona/ibonaframe.htm, last accessed 
24 May 2001, (Kasikili Island) 
4 See Report of the International Law Commission on Draft Articles (1996) II YBILC 169,218 
para 5. (ILC Commentary 1966). 
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differences in approach anse not just from differences over the value of 
advocated methods, but rather from quite different conceptions of basic purpose 
- not just "how", but also "why" we interpret treaties. 
The history of articles 31 and 32 is then analysed, especially the International 
' 
Law Commission' s (ILC) work. After examination of how the articles were 
viewed in the 20 years after the Vienna Convention, I will then examine several 
ICJ cases from the 1990' s which considered the articles, and treaty interpretation 
generally. 
As suggested above, this will show that while there has been the appearance of 
an agreed position, based on a "clear" meaning of the articles, there is no real 
consensus on either role or purpose, or methodology. While there is a dominant 
view, based on one reading of articles 31 and 32, emphasising "primacy of the 
text"5 others, while paying lip-service to the articles ' customary laws status, find 
it necessary and possible to resort to a different approach reminiscent of the 
intentions school. It is submitted that this continuing divergence points to real 
inadequacies in the orthodox position, which need to be resolved if there is to be 
any real clarity on the law. Equally, a simple switch to an "intentions" approach 
is likely to be similarly inadequate. It is necessary to look for a satisfactory 
synthesis, consistent with articles 31 and 32, which can lead to more consistently 
satisfactory interpretations in practice. 
Given the persistent differences, a complete resolution may not be possible. 
However it is suggested that insight can be gained from reference to 
developments in the modem law of contract interpretation. These emerging 
approaches, themselves still controversial, will help to put the claims of the 
various schools in perspective, and suggest how they may work together more 
satisfactorily. Articles 31 and 32 are flexible enough, interpreted appropriately, 
to allow this "modem contract" approach, and this approach is more likely to 
lead to appropriate interpretation in practice. 
5 See Third Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties to the ILC (1964) YBILC 
II 5,52, phrase used by Sir Humphrey Waldock ( Waldock Third Report); compare Libya v 
Chad above n 3, 22, para 41: "Interpretation must be based above all on the text of the treaty''. 
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II BACKGROUND TO THE CONTROVERSY 
Modern writers accept that there have traditionally been three main "schools" in 
debates regarding the purpose of treaty interpretation.6 These are the textual or 
"ordinary or plain meaning" school, the "intentions of the parties" school, and 
the "purpose" or "teleological" school. Other variations exist: McDougall and 
other Yale scholars appear to combine elements of intentions and teleology in 
an approach based on the "genuine shared expectations" of the parties, 7 while 
others espouse a "contextual" approach, 8 which can be seen as either a 
derivative of the textual approach, or an attempt at synthesis of all three main 
schools. Yambrusic argues for the need to search for "objective intentions",9 
and Stone argued that there are in fact no rules, but only fictions which act as a 
smokescreen for judicial creativeness. 10 Given this variety, it is necessary to 
critically examine the main schools and variants, to assess their relative claims. 
A The Textual Approach 
This approach starts from a presumption that words will normally have an 
ordinary meaning, which is either self-evident, or is readily established by 
textual analysis. It is therefore possible to reduce agreements to clear language, 
and there should rarely be any need to "go behind" that to seek deeper 
intentions. 11 We should presume that the intentions of the parties are reflected 
in the words they have used, and the treaty text becomes "sauf de rares 
exceptions, la seule et la plus recente expression de la volunte commune des 
parties."12 Therefore the primary goal of interpretation is to ascertain the 
6 DJ Harris Cases and Materials on International Law (5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 
1998) 810-811, quoting from Fitzmaurice; A Aust, Modern treaty law and practice (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) 184 . 
7 MS McDougall, H D Lasswell, JC Miller, The Interpretation of International Agreements 
and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure ( New Haven Press, New Haven, 
1994 Reissue with additions). See especially Introduction to the Reissue, xxiii-lxxviii. 8 McNair, above n 1,365; see also ILC Proceedings (1964) I YBILC 195 para 27, per Mr 
Reuter. 
9 E S Y ambrusic Treaty Interpretation Theory and Reality (UP A, Lanham MD, 1987) 249-251. 10 Stone, "Fictional elements in treaty interpretation" 1 Sydney Law Review (1955) 344-368. 11 Fitzmaurice, "Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our 'Interpretation' ofit" 
65 AJJL (1971) 358, 363. (Fitzmaurice 1971). 
12 Comment of Max Huber, (1952) 44 vol l Annuaire de l'lnstitut de droit international, 199 
( Annuaire) ; quoted by Sir Humphrey Waldock in Third Report, above n 5, 56, para 13. 
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meaning of the text. 13 This implies a reluctance to examine materials extrinsic to 
the treaty, as it is the words that matter. It is the "intentions of the treaty", not of 
the parties, that we are to elucidate. 
14 
This approach is of ancient pedigree, and can be seen to draw authority from 
Vattel, who famously stated: " [t]he prime general maxim of interpretation is 
that it is not pennissible to interpret that which has no need of interpretation."
15 
While Sinclair suggests that this merely states the result of a process of 
interpretation, rather than a principle of interpretation itself, this is not obvious 
from the words themselves, and Haraszti points out that both the ICJ and its 
predecessor have frequently relied by implication on Vattel to prohibit recourse 
to extrinsic aids, where a treaty was "sufficiently clear", and absent absurdity. 
16 
Vattel therefore propounded and the courts often accepted a "plain meaning 
rule" of interpretation. 
A well developed expression of this approach is given by Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice. Arguing from his analysis of the World Court, 
16
a Fitzmaurice 
enunciated six principles of interpretation. The first three, especially I and II, 
encapsulate a mandatory textualist approach: 
17 
I Principle of actuality (or textuality). Treaties are to be interpreted primarily as 
they stand, and on the basis of their actual texts. 
IIPrinciple of the natural and ordinary meaning. Subject to principle VI below 
[contemporaneity], where applicable, particular words and phrases are to be 
given their normal, natural and unstrained meaning in the context in which they 
13 Sir Ian Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2°d, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1984), 115, swnmarising G G Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and other Treaty Points" (1957) 33 
BYIL (Fitzmaurice 1957) 203, 204-7. 
14 Fitzmaurice 1971 above n 12, 363. 
15 Ede Vattel Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi nature/le, appliques a la conduite et aux 
affaires des Nations et des Souverains Livre II, chapter XVII, quoted in G Haraszti, Some 
Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1973) 91-92. The 
full quotation continues: « Quand une Acte est conc;:u en termes clairs et precis, quand le sens en 
est manifeste et ne conduit a rien d' absurde : on n 'a aucune raison de se refuser au sens que cet 
Acte presente naturellement. » 
16 Haraszti, above n 15, 92-93. Relevant cases include the Lotus case PCIJ Ser A 10, 16, the 
Admissions case, [1948] ICJ 63 , and Competence case [1950] ICJ 227. 
163 Both the ICJ and its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). 
17 Fitzmaurice 1957, 205. 
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occur. This meaning can only be displaced by direct evidence that the terms are to be understood in another sense than the natural and ordinary one, or if such an interpretation would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result. Only if the language is fundamentally obscure or ambiguous may recourse be had to 
extraneous means of interpretation, such as consideration of the surrounding circumstances, or travaux preparatoires. 
III Principle of integration. Treaties are to be interpreted as a whole, and 
particular parts, chapters and sections also as a whole. 
Principles IV requires reference to object and purposes, and to the principle of 
effectiveness, ''to give [ the terms] their fullest weight and effect consistent with 
the normal sense of the words", and principle V permits reference to subsequent 
practice in some circumstances. 18 However, while principles IV and V appear to 
loosen the unremitting textuality of the process, all three of the latter articles are 
explicitly stated to be "[ s ]ubject to the foregoing principles", 19 thereby 
expressly limiting access to other than textual clues. Nothing should get in the 
way of the "natural" or "ordinary" meaning, if it is "clear", and the interpreter 
need not and in theory cannot look any further if there is a clear reading. It is 
presumed that this clear reading must be giving effect to what the parties 
intended. 
I Critique 
The textual approach has usually been accepted as the majority or orthodox 
position,20 and it is not difficult to see why. A textual approach is easy to 
understand and relatively easy to execute. The assumption that parties can 
generally be taken to mean what they say seems a reasonable one. 21 Interpreters 
can therefore make use of a simple reading, supplemented where necessary by 
more sophisticated logical tools, including judicious application of maxims such 
as a contrario or ejusdem generis, without having to turn these into legal rules. 22 
There will normally be neither need nor permission to turn to more wide-
18 Above n 17, 205. Principle VI, as an aspect of the intertemporal law, requires words to be interpreted in the sense they would have been understood at the time of their drafting. 19 Above n 17, 205, emphasis in original. 
20 Waldock Third Report, above n 5, 54, refers to 'the majority of modern writers". 21 See Fitzmaurice 1971, above n 11. 
22 See Haraszti, 110-111 for discussion of the place of the logical principles, albeit from the standpoint of an advocate of an intentions approach. 
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ranging but more complicated sources, such as preparatory works, as the 
presumption is that most texts will be explicable, and the meaning of the text is 
all that is required. Interpreters can limit excursions to the "rare exceptions" 
anticipated by Huber. 2
3 
This does tend to look like an argument of convenience or expediency - we 
should limit ourselves to a textual approach, as it is simpler and cheaper. Jacobs 
has however argued that the textual approach can be justified on grounds of 
principle and policy.24 Textualism will tend to support stability and certainty in 
treaty relations, and therefore in international law generally.
25 The process of 
treaty interpretation needs to be "clear simple and precise", both to allow ready 
use by states, as opposed to international tribunals, and to help avoid the 
incidence of disputes.26 Treaties will be drafted carefully if the parties know 
interpretation will be textual, and they will be able to interpret them themselves, 
avoiding uncertainty and friction.
27 
The problem for an ordinary meaning approach, is that words are rarely or never 
sufficiently or consistently clear. McLauchlan has argued convincingly that it is 
not possible to say that words have a "fixed", or a "plain" meaning or a "proper 
signification", independent either of the writer or reader.
28 Like Lauterpacht,29 
he refers to O W Holmes:
30 
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchangeable, it is a skin of a living 
thought and may vary in colour and content according to the circumstances and 
the time it is used. 
In treaties, even more so than in other formal documents, there is almost 
inevitably ambiguity, shades of meaning, and room for differing views. This 
23 See Huber, above n 12. 
24 Francis Jacobs "Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference" (1969) 18 
ICLQ 318,342. 
25 Jacobs, above n 24, 339. 
26 Jacobs, above n 24, 342. 
27 Jacobs, above n 24, 343. 
28 David McLauchlan "The Plain Meaning Rule of Contract Interpretation" (1996) 2 NZBLQ 
80, 84. 
29 Hersch Lauterpacht "Restrictive Interpretations and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties" ( 1949) 26 BYIL 48, 53. (Lauterpacht 1949). 
30 Towne v Eisner (1918) 245 US 418,425; McLauchlan, above n 28, 85. 
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comes in part from treaties frequently being plurilingual, and also they are, even 
more than contracts, often the results of difficult negotiations between parties 
with widely differing interests, where things may be deliberately left unsaid for 
political or diplomatic reasons, or where an ambiguous formula allows several 
parties to each feel they have achieved their objectives. Lauterpacht quotes the 
Treaty of Lausanne 1924, where the parties could not agree on jurisdiction over 
aliens where offences were committed abroad, and therefore inserted a non-
committal phrase which had to be resolved in the Lotus case.31 Qatar v Bahrain 
is a modem example, where the parties used words, deliberately or accidentally, 
which allowed both sides to think they had got what they wanted. 32 
This prevalence, even "natural" occurrence of ambiguity means it is possible for 
several different interpreters to conclude they have arrived at the single, clear 
and ordinary meaning of a term, while in fact coming to different or opposite 
meanings. 33 This not only undermines the effectiveness of a textual approach, 
as it does not satisfactorily resolve anything, but it also suggests that it will 
often be only a smokescreen or post facto justification for a decision which an 
interpreter reaches by other means. 34 A textual approach can be both arbitrary 
and uncertain, casting significant doubt on its ability to deliver the advantages 
argued for it. 
2 Variations 
Some would argue that textualism is never as rigid as it appears in theory. The 
approach accepts that documents will sometimes be ambiguous, necessitating a 
wider range of tools - it merely suggests ambiguity is less prevalent or likely 
than others consider. In any case, what is being set out in Fitzmaurice' s 
principles, even arguably in articles 31 and 32, is a contextual approach, not a 
rigid textual one.35 Words only have meaning in their context, and this is 
3 1 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 77-78. 
32 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3; see discussion below, 37-45. 
33 Haraszti, above n 13, 93-94, shows that in both the Competence and Asylum cases, different 
members of the Court came to opposite meanings for disputed terms, each holding that any other 
meaning was " inconceivable" as the meaning was "clear". 
34 See Lauterpacht I 949, above n 29, 53-55, especially his discussion of the resolution of 
interpretation issues in Co,fu Channel Merits 1949 ICJ, 24. 
35 Jacobs, above n 24, 334-335. 
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clearly allowed for in Fitzmaurice's principle III.
36 This approach is embodied 
in the 1956 Resolution of the Institute of International Law,
37 and is also at the 
heart ofMcNair's synthesis. 38 
The problem with context is how wide should it be. To the textualist, it will 
merely be the words or the text in their context, no broader than the treaty itself, 
whereas McNair envisages something wider, and proponents of intentions or 
teleology will not see any reasons to limit it at all. If the contextual approach is 
no more than a more nuanced version of the textual, then it will still be 
interested in revealing only the meaning of the text, and will be subject to the 
same criticisms. If its purposes are in fact broader, then it may be better placed 
under one of the other schools, or may in fact be a genuine synthesis. The 
question of possible syntheses will be returned to in section VI. 
B The Intentions of the Parties 
For the "intentions" school, the primary or only goal of interpretation is to 
establish the intention of the parties, so it can be given effect. 
39 As Hersch 
Lauterpacht, the most notable proponent ofthis approach put it:
40 
It is the duty of the judge to resort to all available means - including rules of 
construction - to discover the intentions of the parties; to avoid using rules of 
interpretation as a ready substitute for active and independent search for 
intention; and to refrain from neglecting any possible clues, however 
troublesome may be their examination and however liable they may be to abuse, 
which may reveal or render clear the intention of the authors of the rule to be 
interpreted. 
Several points emerge. First, the disagreements between the schools are about 
more than method. The debate is about the purpose or object of treaty 
interpretation, not just allowable or preferable techniques. Secondly, the 
position we take on purpose affects the approach to methods. As the intentions 
school is unwilling to ascribe a life or meaning of its own to text, it more easily 
36 See above, 5. 
37 Quoted in Waldock Third Report, above n 5, 55. 
38 McNair, above n 1, 365: tribunals are to give effect to "[the parties'] intention as expressed 
in the words used by them in the light of the surrounding circumstances". 
39 SeeSinclair,aboven 13,114. 
40 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 83. 
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accepts that no possible tool for interpretation, which might reveal actual 
intentions, should be excluded. The intentions school will usually begin with 
text, but look also to context, broadly defined, consider evidence contained in 
preparatory works or other sources, use supposed "rules" such as a contrario as 
a guide or aid where useful, and examine the subsequent conduct of the parties 
as evidence of intentions. Thirdly, there is at least some distinction between the 
act of interpretation and that of application, even though one follows the other.41 
By contrast, for the textualist, if interpretation is achieved by ascertaining the 
ordinary meaning, then there is arguably no separate process of application, as 
the application proceeds naturally from the clarified ordinary meaning. 
While the intentions school denies Huber's contention that the words of the text 
are the authentic expression of the will of the parties - and therefore all that 
need be explained - the position does not deny an important place to text. In 
proposed draft articles for the ILi, Lauterpacht made this clear:42 
1 La recherche de }'intention des parties etant le but principal de }'interpretation, 
ii est legitime et desirable, dans l'inten~t de la bonne foi et de la stabilite des 
transactions intemationales, de prendre le sens nature! des termes comme point 
de depart du processus d'interpretation. C'est a la partie qui pretend donner 
aux termes . . . un sens different ... ou qui leur attribue un sens apparemment clair 
qu'incomble le fardeau de la preuve. La clarte apparente ou supposee de ces 
termes ou dispositions ne saurait justifier le rejet de la preuve contraire ni la 
rendre indfunent difficile 
While it has been argued that Lauterpacht's inclusion of the text as starting point 
was probably a concession to textualists,43 no doubt in the context of difficult 
debates among the Institute, the intentions school clearly does recognise the 
weight an apparently unambiguous text carries - it merely does not accept it as 
decisive, given the different conception of the underlying purpose. If in a 
particular case there is better and contradicting evidence, it cannot be ignored. 
41 See Haraszti, above n 13, 29 on the difference between interpretation and the act of 
application to a particular case. 
42 (1950) 43 (I) Annuaire 433. Emphasis added. Principle 2 enshrines widest possible resort to 
preparatory works, even where the words are "clear" but contested. 
43 Jacobs, above n 24, 321. 
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1 Critique 
On one level the intentions approach is hard to argue with. It is easy to see that 
the underlying object is a purer version than that aimed at by the textual 
approach: one is looking for actual common intentions, rather than merely 
presuming that some of the words used are the only possible expression of 
common will. This suggests an intentions approach is more likely to give effect 
to good faith and the basic imperative of pacta sunt servanda. 
44 It is treaties 
which must be given effect to in good faith, not merely words. On an equally 
fundamental level, it can be argued that an intentions approach is required by the 
consensual basis of international law:45 intentions, rather than presumed 
intentions based on an expression, must be preferable. 
There are of course immediate objections to this apparent superiority. Firstly it 
is significant that it is often referred to as the "subjective" school, often by 
Anglo-Saxon commentators.46 There is an inherent distrust of the subjective as 
ultimately unknowable, which makes it at least uncertain if not unattainable. It 
is significant that Sinclair463 contrasts the subjective school with the textual or 
"objective": that which is objective is surely more likely to provide stronger 
evidence and better analysis. 
Linked to the suspicion of subjectivity is the apparent uncertainty of many of the 
proposed sources. Preparatory works are just as likely to support both sides of 
an argument,47 and may also be misleading or incomplete.
48 Similar or greater 
difficulties attach to other extrinsic sources, such as the circumstances of the 
conclusion of a treaty. The intentions or "subjective" approach may in fact be 
impossible of appropriate application. 
44 Vienna Convention article 26. 
45 Jacobs, above n 24, 321 , also makes this point. 
46 See for instance Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 
Treaty Interpretation and Certain other Treaty Points" 195 I BYIL 1, n 14 (Fitzmaurice 1951 ); 
Sinclair, above n 13, 114-115; Jacobs, above n 24, 320-322 and throughout. 
4
6a Sinclair, above n 13, 115. 
47 Annuaire, above n 42, per Sir Eric Beckett; Jacobs, above n 24, 339. 
48 ILC Commentary (1966) II YBILC 20, 51. (ILC Commentary 1966) 
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These objections are not in fact the most damaging to the intentions approach. 
"Subjective" is no more than a label, and it would be just as accurate to refer to 
an enquiry into the parties' "actual intentions" as their subjective ones. There is 
nothing to suggest that evidence provided in an analysis of intentions should not 
be subject to tests of reliability, and it has already been shown above that the 
text is not necessarily certain either. Finally, the reality is that preparatory 
works will be referred to almost routinely.49 Whether the text or other sources 
provide the most conclusive evidence of intentions and therefore meaning will 
vary between cases, and should not be determined by arbitrary restrictions. 
The more difficult criticism is that common intention is often illusory. While 
the critics point this out, 50 Lauterpacht himself is alert to the issue, listing five 
discrete cases where there will be no actual common intention. 51 
While the principle of good faith may deal with some of these categories,52 
Lauterpacht advocates in the end for such cases a process of analysis, 
considering all the circumstances including what can be said of common 
intentions that do or did exist, and the treaty purpose, to arrive at an "effective", 
"assumed" or "imputed" intention. 53 Lauterpacht considers this will be "no 
mere fiction",54 but Stone55 certainly and textualists probably would not agree. 
In the end, the intentions school runs into the same limitation as textualism: it 
will often be based on presumptions not only impossible of proof but actually 
untrue. In the case of intentions it arguably undercuts the very purpose the 
school aims at. 
49 ILC Commentary 1966, above n 48, 223. 
5° Fitzmaurice 1951 , above n 46; Beckett, Annuaire, above n 42, 435-444; J Stone, "Fictional 
elements in treaty interpretation" 1 Sydney Law Review ( 1955) 344, 347-350. 
5 1 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 76-82. The different categories include: where the parties 
each urJknowingly attribute different meanings to the same words; where one party is aware of 
the other' s misapprehension of what has been included, and hopes to benefit from the ambiguity; 
where the parties use an ambiguous or non-committal expression to deal with a point of 
disagreement; where the parties gave no thought to the actual situation which later arises; and 
where different provisions of the same treaty are mutually contradictory. 
52 See for instance Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 77 on the ambiguity by design problem. 
53 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 79, 81. 
54 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 79. 
55 Stone, above n 50, 348. 
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It is not necessary to agree with Jacobs, that Lauterpacht's difficulty leads him 
into teleology.56 Lauterpacht relies so far as possible on whatever actual 
common intention is available, and limits the application of the principle of 
effectiveness, or effective interpretation, to what the parties intended: the 
parties may have intended the treaty to be less than fully effective over the 
potential subject matter and range of objects of their treaty.
57 Even so, given 
that Lauterpacht concedes there will be many occasions where there is no 
common intention, 58 it is clear that the intentions approach cannot be a complete 
system of interpretation. There is therefore room for frequent controversy 
about whether any particular situation falls within one of the five categories, or 
is amenable to resolution by an intentions analysis, and the method may be 
guilty of muddying waters it seeks to clarify. Lauterpacht felt able, even 
compelled, to fill gaps in intentions, as signed treaties are part of international 
law, which allows no gaps.59 However he therefore would presume or imply 
intention, which he himself argued predicates that intention does not matter. 
60 
It must be accepted that the fully developed scheme of the intentions approach is 
simply too optimistic in its claims. 
2 Variations 
An intentions-based approach is important to some writers who are not 
adherents of the school. Y ambrusic considers that interpretation is a "complex 
intellectual exercise",61 where text is the starting point, but the apparent or 
objective intentions of the parties are important. As words are ambiguous, the 
interpreter must consider them in all the factual and legal circumstances to 
establish both meaning and effect.62 This appears to be a reasonable attempt at 
combining some of the better features of textual and intentions approaches. 
However, Yambrusic makes it clear that is only apparent or objective intention 
that can ever be found, as "the content of the individual wills is always 
56 Jacobs above n 24, 321. 
57 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 74. 
58 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 76. 
59 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29,76. 
60 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29,75 . 
61 Yambrusic, above n 9, 250. 
62 Yambrusic, above n 9, 251. 
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heterogeneous. "63 Intention is therefore always a construct, even if it 1s 
"objectively" obtained from words and circumstances. 
This thesis seems unnecessarily pessimistic. Taken to its logical conclusion, it 
in fact denies the consensual basis of international law. While it is true that 
parties come with different motives, this does not mean they cannot agree on 
specifics. Surely, while agreeing there will often be lack of actual intention, we 
can recognise there will be many cases where it exists and can be identified. In 
the end, while Y ambrusic clearly considers the textual approach inadequate on 
its own, the denial of actual intentions essentially limits the product of 
interpretation to a construct in the mind of the interpreter. 
By contrast, McDougall, Lasswell and Miller (McDougal) start from 
thoroughgoing acceptance of the importance of subjective intentions. After 
positing a complex communications theory with few if any interactions or 
influences out of the mix,64 McDougal argues that the "primary aim" of 
interpretation is to "discover the shared expectations that the parties to the 
relevant communication have succeeded in creating in each other.',65 The 
interpreter is not limited by any over-reliance on any particular text, but must 
effectively reconstruct the whole series of dealings to determine what the parties 
did or did not succeed in achieving.66 This leads to what Jacobs has described as 
an American "inclusive" approach to interpretation, where no source is 
excluded, and none takes precedence, except based on the evidence of the 
specific case. 67 
This looks like intentions, allied to modern communications theory. However 
the theory does not stop there, and McDougal defines an explicitly separate 
application phase which must be conducted once the shared subjectivity has 
been established. Of course, adherents of an intentions approach will often also 
63 Yambrusic, above n 9,248. 
64 McDougal, above n 7, xii-xvi. 
65 McDougal, above n 7, xvi. 
66 McDougall, above n 7, xvii-xviii. 
67 Jacobs, above n 24, 324. 
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point out that application is a separate and subsequent process, 68 but for 
McDougall it takes on a strongly teleological shape. Appliers must make use of 
supplementation to cover gaps and remaining ambiguities, and of policing and 
integration to determine the most appropriate outcome.69 In doing so, they are 
explicitly making choices based on "basic community policy", and using the 
process of application to shape world order. 
70 
This makes McDougal' s approach subject to the same criticisms raised in 
respect of extreme teleological schemes, discussed below, in terms of legislating 
rather than clarifying law. This seems a curious blend, given the passionate 
commitment to uncovering actual expectations. In the end it is difficult to 
accept that if genuine shared expectations are so important, they can be 
overridden, if not by a "clear" text, then by a wider programme. It remains to be 
seen whether all versions of teleology suffer from the same vice. 
C Teleological Interpretation 
A clear statement of the teleological approach is contained in the Harvard 
Research Draft Convention on the law of treaties, especially its proposed article 
19 (a) and the associated comrnentary:7 1 
The process of interpretation ... cannot be . . . a mere mechanical one of drawing 
inevitable meanings from the words in a text, or of .. . discovering some pre-
existing specific intention of the parties with respect to every situation .. .In most 
instances ... interpretation involves giving a meaning to a text ... which is logical, 
reasonable and most likely to accord with and to effectuate the larger general 
purpose which the parties desired the treaty to serve. 
This approach therefore focuses not on the literal meaning of the text per se, or 
the parties' intentions, but rather on the purpose of the treaty, and on giving 
effect to that. At a most basic level, this may be no more than using the treaty 
purpose as evidenced by the treaty text itself, to clarify the meaning of unclear 
provisions, as a natural corollary of the textual approach, or alternatively a 
68 See Haraszti, above n 13, 29. 
69 McDougal above n 7, ix-xx. 
70 McDougal, above n 7, lxxiii. 
7 1 Harvard Research in International Law, "Law of Treaties" (1935) 29 AflL Supp 653 , 939 
(Harvard). 
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matter of giving effect to the true intention of the parties, once established. 72 
However, the broader or more general the alleged purpose is allowed to be 
defined, the more scope there is for interpretive activism and "development" of 
the meaning, independent of the literal text or the actual will of the parties. 
Effectively, under a teleological approach, a treaty may have its terms amended 
or augmented, if this is found to be in keeping with the "general purpose". 73 In 
fact it is highly arguable that draft article 19(a) also implies the doctrine of 
"emergent purpose"74, so that even the original, intended purpose need not 
control, but rather a later conception of how the purpose should be understood in 
modem conditions. 75 
The approach is particularly directed at multilateral law-making treaties, and has 
been used to interpret and develop the constitutive documents of international 
organisations. 76 It has arguably been adopted by the European Court of Human 
Rights, for instance in the Golder case, 77 and may have resulted in the Court 
amending rather than interpreting the treaty. 
1 Critique 
In its more mnocuous forms, the teleological approach is hardly a separate 
approach at all, but merely sensible use of available interpretative resources. 
Similarly, it could, if appropriately contained be no more than an outworking of 
the principle of effectiveness, which both major schools accept within limits. 78 
In determining how parties might give appropriate effect to a treaty, it seems 
only right that appropriateness be judged in the light of objects and purposes. 
The problem with the approach however is that given its broad conception, and 
72 Jacobs, above n 24, 319. 
73 Haraszti above n 13, l l 3. 
74 Jacobs, above n 24, 320. 
75 Article 19(a) includes in part: " . .. the circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was 
entered into, the change in these circumstances sought to be effected, ... and the conditions 
prevailing at the time the interpretation is being made, are to be considered in connection with 
the general purpose which the treaty is intended to serve" Harvard, above n 71, 937. 76 See C F Amerasinghe Principles of the institutional law of international organizations 
(Cambridge University Press, England, 1996), 25. Jacobs, above n 24, 320 cites as generally 
accepted that for constitutional documents of international organisations objects and purposes 
may have to be interpreted in the light of subsequent developments in international organisation. 11 Golder case 57 ILR 209; see Sinclair, aboven 1, 131-133. 
78 Fitzmaurice 1957, above n 17, principle IV; Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 74. 
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its tendency to deny, at least in the Harvard Draft form, any hard and fast 
limitations or rules,79 it is equally or more likely to operate quite differently, as 
a licence to judicial activism or legislation. In the more developed form it may 
once again be seen not so much as a form of interpretation, but a quite separate 
activity, which may or may not be appropriate in certain cases, such as in 
dealing with the development of international organisations. 
80 Given its 
capacity to undermine international law as the product of consenting states, its 
implementation as a general approach to interpretation appears both 
unwarranted and unlikely. 
2 Variations 
The particular synthesis of McDougall has been discussed above. In addition, 
Stone's view of purported rules of interpretation as fictions which hide judicial 
creativeness comes broadly within the teleological area. Stone draws heavily on 
the idea of rules as fictions, contained in the Harvard commentary.
81 His focus 
however is less on propounding a "general purpose" approach to replace the 
"fictions", but rather on demonstrating that, due to the lack of any sound 
comprehensive basis for interpretation, judicial creativeness, though fraught 
with difficulty, is inevitable and necessary in international life, even if judges do 
not admit or even recognise it.82 
In a sense Stone's thesis is now uncontroversial. The extensive "canons" of 
interpretation are not recognised as legal rules, but only the general rule and 
supplementary means of articles 31 and 32. His critique of the gaps and 
inconsistencies in the textual and intentions approaches is usually fair, and is 
borne out in the criticisms discussed above. If however, Stone' s solution is 
"leave it to the judges", this seems at least a too early concession that no 
coherent law on interpretation is possible. The remainder of this essay will 
79 Harvard, above n 71 , 939. 
80 The ILC in its commentary explicitly decided not to include any commentary on 
interpretation of international organisation instruments, as the matter was controversial, and a 
special case: ILC Commentary (I 964) II YBILC, 205 para 17. (ILC Commentary 1964). 
81 Stone, above n 10, 344-345. 
82 Stone, above n 10, 363-368. 
17 
examine the ILC attempt to achieve coherence, how the courts have reacted to it, 
and whether any other possibilities for synthesis remain to be explored. 
III DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONVENTION ARTICLES 
A Early Activity 
The nature or possibility of legal rules covering interpretation remained 
contentious throughout the 1950s and early 60s. Many of the key contributions 
to the academic debate come from this period. 83 Despite statements by the 
majority of the ICJ adopting a textual approach, 84 the debate continued off and 
on through the work of the International Law Institute (ILi) from 1950 through 
to 1956, and it seemed to contemporaries that the attempt at resolution was 
abandoned due to impossibility.85 With Fitzmaurice as Special Rapporteur the 
ILi did agree articles in 1956 adopting a textual approach, but in vague and 
uncertain terms. 86 It is therefore hardly surprising that members of the ILC 
initially approached their consideration of interpretation with pessimism and 
scepticism. 87 
B Work of the ILC 
1 1964 
Before considering the content of legal rules on interpretation, the ILC had to 
decide whether such rules were possible or desirable. 88 The scepticism of the 
Harvard Draft, together with the strength of the debate between the schools 
made the question a real issue, and it clearly was an option to leave 
interpretation out of the eventual codification of the law of treaties. 
Nevertheless, both the Special Rapporteur and the Commission came quite 
quickly to the conclusion that the various maxims often applied to interpretation, 
83 See for instance Fitzmaurice, 1951 , 1957, above ns 17 & 11, Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 
Stone above n 10, and the contributions of Huber, Eckert, Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice and others to 
ILI debates: Annuaire (1950) 43 I, 366-460; (1952) 44 II,359-406; (1956) 46 317-349. 84 Admissions Case [ 1950] ICJ 8. Competence Case [ 1948] 63. 
85 Stone, above n 10, 345 and his n7a. 
86 (1956) 46 Annuaire 348-349; Jacobs, above n 24, 322. 
87 ILC Proceedings (1964) YBILC I 275-278, comments of Messrs Tunkin, Briggs, de Luna, 
Tabibi, Amado, Ruda and Rosenne (ILC Proceedings 1964). 
88 Waldock Third Report above n 5, 53 para 1, 54 - 55, para 8; ILC Proceedings, above n 87. 
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were not legal rules, but only potential aids and guides depending on a particular 
situation or text. 89 They should therefore be excluded from any draft, even as 
mere examples of useful tools.90 However it should be possible and therefore 
desirable to identify the "comparatively few rules" constituting the "strictly legal 
basis" of interpretation",91 which is what the ILC set out to do. 
This approach seems uncontroversial today. It recognises that interpretation is 
always a matter of addressing a particular case, albeit within some framework, 
but not of applying rigid grammatical rules to produce a mechanical answer. 
This at least recognises the limits of textualism. However, in taking this 
approach Sir Humphrey Waldock, and the Commission by adopting his words in 
slightly watered down form,92 based their argument on the need to reinforce or 
establish the importance of text. Apart from the obvious point that some basic 
rules will help to avoid arbitrary interpretation, the other main reason given is 
the need to "take a clear position in regard to the role of the text", given "the 
tendency of doctrinal differences" to ''weaken the significance of the text".
93 
Even in deciding whether to have legal rules, battle lines were being drawn on 
the main doctrinal dispute between text and intentions. 
The question therefore becomes, did the ILC follow through from this 
reasoning, to propose an essentially textual answer to the question of the basis or 
purpose of treaty interpretation? There seems little doubt the members were 
led to begin from this point by their Special Rapporteur. Waldock's Third 
Report, while admitting the controversy, accepts the textual as the "majority" 
position, and explicitly promotes it as the resolution to the debate.
94 He 
acknowledges the 1956 ILI articles and Fitzmaurice's six principles as 
"inspiration" in proposing the original drafts,95 which follow a clearly textual 
approach. Proposed article 70 (later proposed article 69) explicitly seeks to 
89 Waldock Third Report above n 5, 54 para 6; ILC Commentary 1964, above n 80, 200, para 5 
90 Waldock Third Report above n 5, 54, para 8. 
91 Waldock Third Report above n 5, 54 para 8; ILC Commentary 1964, above n 80, 200, para 6. 
92 Waldock Third Report above n 5, 54 para 8; ILC Commentary 1964, above n 80, 200, para 6. 
9" • , Waldock Third Report above n 5, 54 para 8. The ILC Commentary 1964,above n 80, 200, 
para 6, merely argues the desirability of taking a clear position on the text. 
94 Waldock Third Report above n 5, 52- 61. 
95 Waldock Third Report above n 5, 55 para 10. 
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incorporate Fitzmaurice's first three and sixth principles (textuality, ordinary 
meaning, integration and contemporaneity ) - ''the very essence of the textual 
approach" as well as the pacta sunt servanda principle of interpretation in good 
faith. 96 For Waldock, the elucidation of the meaning of the text is both the 
"starting point" and "purpose" of interpretation. 97 
Waldock's views clearly enjoyed support amongst members,96 as evidenced not 
least by their willingness to adopt much of the text of Waldock's report as their 
commentary with apparently minor amendments. 99 One member explicitly 
referred to Vattel's basic rule,100 and the Chairman considered it was in fact 
implicit in the draft, although he would prefer not to lay ''too much stress" on 
it. 101 However it is clear from a reading of the Commission's first discussions on 
the draft articles that all of the major schools had some influence on at least 
some Commissioners' views. Messrs Tabibi and Pessou were most explicit in 
stressing the primacy of the intentions of the parties, 102 and Messrs Rosenne and 
Yasseen also stressed the importance of intentions, and the need to go beyond 
merely textual analysis. 103 Mr Bartos on the other hand adopted the most 
obviously teleological approach, preferring to rely on the "spirit" and the objects 
and purposes of the treaty, considering they should be the basis of interpretation, 
not the text. 104 Mr Briggs on the other hand appeared to adopt a cautious 
"inclusive" approach, based loosely on the Harvard draft. 
Thus while Waldock continued to assume the Commission's "strong 
predilection for textual interpretation" at least in 1964, 105 it can be seen that 
consideration and redrafting of the proposed articles involved much more of a 
96 Waldock Third Report, above n 5, 56, para 14. 
97 Waldock Third Report, above n 5, 56, para 13. 
98 See for example ILC Proceedings 1964, above n 87,280, para 79, per Chairman Ago, 277 
para 36 per Mr Ruda, 280, para 75-76, per Mr Pal; and to a lesser extent Mr Rosenne, 278, para 
40, Mr Briggs, 275, para 10. 
99 Compare Waldock Third Report , above n 5, 53ff, paras 1-8, and ILC Commentary 1964, 
above n 80 199 paras 1-6. 
100 ILC Proceedings 1964, above n 87, 277 para 33 , per Mr Ruda. 
101 ILC Proceedings 1964, above n 87, 280, para 79. 
102 ILC Proceedings 1964, above n 87, 276, para 25 per Mr Tabibi; 278, para 46. 103 ILC Proceedings 1964, above n 87, 278, para 40 per Mr Rosenne; 286, para 49, per Mr 
Yasseen. 
104 ILC Proceedings 1964, above n 87, 279-280, paras 64, 67; 281 , para 91. 105 ILC Proceedings 1964, above n 87, 314, para 71. 
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process of compromise and movement away from thoroughgoing textuality. 
Reference to "natural" meaning was quickly dropped, and the "object and 
purpose" of the treaty was brought into paragraph 1, instead of the Third 
Report' s proposed ancillary position.
106 In addition, small but significant 
changes appeared in the commentary: references agreeing with "the primacy of 
the text" were toned down or disappeared, 
107 and while the text is still the 
starting point, it is no longer the starting point and purpose of interpretation.
108 
Similarly, in the discussion of the degree to which recourse could be had to 
supplementary means, a traditional battleground of the textual/intentions debate, 
there is evidence of some compromise, to lessen the effects of too strict a textual 
approach, by allowing recourse at any time to "confirm" a meaning.
109 Also, 
evidence of concordant subsequent practice is moved up to the first article, as a 
primary or authentic means of interpretation.
110 Textuality retains explicit pride 
of place in the commentary, but it is clear that even in 1964 the Commission did 
not agree or intend a purely textual approach. 
The formula of elucidation of the meaning of the text as the "starting point for 
interpretation" is in fact remarkably close to Lauterpacht' s proposed 1950 
article. 111 Here it is shorn of reference to the search for intentions as the 
"principal goal" for interpretation, and there is recognition that there is to be no 
ab initio investigation of parties' intentions.
112 However, given that the ILC is 
descnbing a starting point, not an endpoint, or indeed "the purpose" of 
interpretation, it is highly likely that even Lauterpacht could agree with the 
expression chosen. By leaving out reference to overriding purpose, it appears 
the ILC was adopting exactly the approach to contentious issues which 
Lauterpacht had noted: the adoption of vague or ambiguous language, or the 
deletion of a difficult phrase, to cover a lack of actual agreement, common 
106 See lLC Proceedings 1964, above n 87,275 para 11 , Mr Brigg' s objection; compare 
Waldock' s draft article 70 para 1 with lLC's draft article 69 para l, lLC Commentary 1964, 199. 
107 Compare lLC Commentary 1964, above n 80, 200 para 3 c) and 200 para 9 with Waldock 
Third Report, above n 5, 54 para 5 and 56 para 13 . 
108 ILC Commentary 1964, above n 80, 201, para 9. 
109 ILC Commentary 1964, above n 80, 204-205, paras 15-16. 
110 Article 69 para 3. See also Waldock's comment on the decision of the Commission, Sixth 
Report of the Special Rapporteur (1966) II YBILC 98, para 18 (Waldock Sixth Report). 
111 See above n 42. 
112 lLC Commentary 1964, above n 80, 201 , para 9. 
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understanding or intention. 11 3 Perhaps the most important conclusion which can 
be drawn from the 1964 deliberations of the ILC was that the members had no 
common intention on the fundamental purpose of treaty interpretation, and that 
therefore all their tentative conclusions on methods and sources were attempts to 
reach compromises that adherents of different approaches could agree with. 
2 1966 
In 1966 the ILC considered the responses of governments, and a further report 
from the Special Rapporteur. 11 3a While the report detects "general endorsement" 
for the ILC-proposed starting point from governments, it did note also that there 
were government proponents, for either a more explicitly textual or an avowedly 
intentions purpose as the basis for interpretation. 114 This suggests at least some 
states recognised that the ILC was fudging the basic issue, in the interests of 
achieving some workable compromise. 
Once again both the Sixth Report and the eventual commentary to the revised 
draft articles still appear strongly textual: the commentary to draft article 27 114a 
largely repeats the 1964 logic making text the starting point, including Huber's 
comment quoted above. 11 5 United States proposals to de-emphasise ordinary 
meaning, as just one of six factors were rejected, 11 6 as were proposals from 
some states and several Commission members to raise preparatory works and 
other supplementary means to the status of primary means. 117 It is therefore not 
surprising that states tended to view the drafts as incorporating ''the textual 
approach". 11 8 
113 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 77-78 and see above, 10-11. 
1133 Still Sir Humphrey Waldock. 
114 Waldock Sixth Report, above n 110, 94, para 2; see 91-93, contrasting positions of 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, amongst others. 
1143 Formerly article 69/70, to become eventual article 31 . 
115 Commentary on the draft articles, (1966) II YBILC 220, para 11 (ILC Commentary 1966) 
See Huber, above n 12. 
116 Waldock Sixth Report, above n 110, 94-95 para 3. 
11 7 Waldock Sixth Report, above n 110, 99 para 19-20; ILC Commentary 1966 above n 4, 220 
para 10. 
118 Waldock Sixth Report, above n 110, 91-93. See for instance views oflsrael, UK. 
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In reality the ILC can be seen to have further qualified the textual approach by 
1966, to the point where it should be recognised as something different. The 
Proceedings show that the members remained deeply divided. The eventual 
compromise on article 28/32, on supplementary means, appears to be the most 
that a textually-inclined majority would accept, and the least that a strong 
minority could live with.
119 A significant proportion of debating time was taken 
up with supplementary means, with the minority strongly advocating that the 
distinction between primary and secondary means be abolished, and/or that at 
least preparatory works be included in article 27 /31. 
120 The debate can be seen 
as an analogue for one not explicitly held, over the basic purpose of 
interpretation. 
In the end, the minority appears to have given up a fight it could not win, but to 
have found more common ground with the Special Rapporteur in another area 
which helped to mitigate the loss. This was on the critical issue of whether there 
was any hierarchy of means, or whether the process of interpretation was to be 
regarded as a "unity". In response to United States and other state criticisms 
that the original drafts set up an inappropriate hierarchical system, with ordinary 
meaning pre-eminent, Waldock suggested that the ILC had never intended to set 
up a hierarchy: there was to be a general rule, not rules in priority order. All the 
various elements would be thrown into the "crucible", in a "combined 
operation". 121 
This crucible analogy was taken up with alacrity by the dissenters, 
122 and was 
confirmed in the commentary, where the unity of the process of interpretation 
was also stressed.
123 This placing of all interpretative means in article 27 /31 on 
a par significantly undermines any textual predominance in the general rule. 
While the textualists can and did
124 read references to context, object and 
119 ILC Proceedings (1966) I Pt II, 271 para 41, per Sir H Waldock. (ILC Proceedings 1966). 
120 ILC Proceedings 1966, above n 119, 187 para 35, per Mr Briggs; 197 para 41 per Mr 
Tsuoroka; see 199-207 for the divided views on preparatory works. 
121 Waldock Sixth Report above n 110, 95 para 4. 
122 ILC Proceedings 1966, above n 119, 186 para 19, per Mr Rosenne. 
123 ILC Commentary 1966, above n 4, 220-221. 
124 ILC Proceedings 1966, above n 119, 188, paras 38-39, per Mr Reuter. 
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purpose as to be found primarily from the text, such a reading is not self-evident 
from the text, and in any case the article now clearly contained, on an equal 
footing in the "crucible" approach, explicit reference to special meaning 
intended by the parties, and concordant subsequent practice. 125 Also, even the 
confirmed relegation of preparatory works and other "supplementary" means is 
modified, not only by the possibility of their "confirmatory" use, but also in the 
commentary, where the means in article 28/32 are brought within the '"unity of 
the process of interpretation". 126 
Given the now extensive resort to extrinsic means of interpretation - that is, 
from outside the actual text of the treaty - and the fact that the object and 
purpose of a treaty can be seen to be analogous to the intentions of its drafters, 
not a mere extrapolation from the text, it is clear that while interpretation is still 
to start from the text, as the most obvious place to look first, a wide range of 
sources and approaches can and should be used. While the ILC remains 
studiously silent on the purpose of treaty interpretation, it must be said that the 
evolving approach of the draft articles is more consistent with as broad an 
enquiry as necessary to establish the will of the parties, rather than a simply 
linguistic exercise to clarify the meaning of a text. No doubt the continued 
silence on this critical point of difference allowed the members to reach a text 
that all could accept, but both that text and the work behind it show permission, 
even encouragement, to depart from a textual approach. 
3 Relevance of the ILC's work 
The debate over the relative merits of different methods and sources for 
interpretation raises an issue about the relevance of the work of the ILC to our 
understanding of the law. What recourse should be had to the ILC work when 
interpreting articles 31 and 32? Clearly the Vienna Conference agreed the 
articles, not the ILC, albeit without significant amendment from the ILC 
drafts. 127 Should we have reference to preparatory works to interpret articles 31 
125 Article 27/31 paras 4 and 3 b). 
126 ILC Commentary 1966, above n 4, 220, para 10. 
127 Article 31 3(a) was broadened by the addition of"or the application of its provisions", and 
3(b) regarding subsequent practice was amended so that such practice had to demonstrate the 
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an 32? In any case, do the deliberations of the ILC amount to preparatory 
works? The ILC itself was alive to the last issue, and discussed it in 1966. 128 
In the first place, it must be held that whatever one position one takes on the 
appropriate approach to interpretation, the articles are ambiguous on their face 
and necessitate a wide recourse to other sources. The meaning of "object and 
purpose" is ambiguous, as is the specific content of the good faith obligation. It 
is not clear how in article 31 ( 4) a special meaning is to be established: as this is 
a "primary" means of interpretation, does this imply one can always have 
recourse to the dealings of the parties to check for special meanings? Similarly 
the consequences of confirmatory resort to supplementary means are not clear: if 
they do not confirm but contradict an otherwise apparently "clear" meaning, do 
they have weight? 
In the light of such ambiguities, it is both necessary and desirable to refer to the 
ILC work. The ILC accepted that their work could give insight into the intended 
meaning, especially where adopted unchanged.129 While it was possible for a 
conference to attribute a different meaning to the same text, 130 the meaning 
intended by the ILC is relevant to interpretation. Importantly, the ILC also 
recognised that it would be counter-productive to try to define preparatory 
works, as this might only lead to exclusion of relevant evidence. 13 1 This 
confirms not only that the ILC work is an important source in understanding the 
content of the law, but also that the interpretation enquiry is a broad one. The 
ILC' s conceptualisation of a "crucible" is self-reinforcing. Whatever position 
one takes on the apparent clarity or ambiguity of the text of the articles, the 
developed understanding of the ILC of the need to approach interpretation as an 
"agreement" of the parties, not their "understanding; See Villiger Customary International Law 
and Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985) 331 . 
128 ILC Proceedings 1966, above n 119, 201 para 35, per Mr Rosenne, raising the issue; 205, 
para 25 per Chairman Yasseen, replying; 205 para 27, per Mr Tunkin, qualified agreement with 
Chairman that proceedings were preparatory works; 206 para 34, per Mr El-Erian, also 
supporting ILC proceedings as preparatory work. 
129 See Chairman Yasseen, above n 128. 
130 See views of Mr Tunkin, above n 128. 
131 ILC Commentary 1966, above n 4, 223 para 20. 
25 
integrated, unified process should shape how the modem interpreter of any 
treaty approaches their task. 
C The Vienna Conference 
The Conference adopted the draft articles largely unchanged, by unarumous 
votes. 132 While this strengthens the importance of the ILC's work, it does not 
suggest a common understanding on what the articles meant. Debate continued 
about the merits of different approaches, 133 and states were divided on whether 
article 27 embedded textualism, or provided for parity of means.134 There was a 
similar split on article 28, on whether it allowed liberal or restricted access to 
supplementary means. 135 The proportions are remarkably similar to those of the 
opposing views in the ILC, where perhaps five out of 18 members adopted a 
consistently more "liberal" line. 136 
It is suggested that states were as far from common intention on the basis or 
purpose of interpretation as the ILC. Amendments from intentions or a textual 
perspectives were decisively voted down, 137 suggesting no real agreement about 
what underpinned the articles. The result has the appearance of delegates 
sticking to a workable compromise, fudging the difficult issue as did the ILC. 
While it is probably true that most states thought they were adopting a textual 
approach, perhaps with reasonable scope to adopt other means, they specifically 
avoided saying so in the text. The ILC draft can in that sense be seen as a work 
of some genius, as it allowed the parties, to reach agreement on a text, without 
first having to resolve the old doctrinal disputes. 
This leaves the implication that the relative claims of the schools rernam 
inherent but unresolved in the wording, giving later interpreters opportunity to 
132 See Villiger, above n 127; art 27 was adopted 97 - 0, art 28 101 - 0. 
133 Villiger, above n 127, 332. 
134 Villiger, above n 127, 333. Seven states agreed with the Commission on parity of means in 
article 27, while 19 thought the article required the textual approach. 
135 Villiger, above n 127, 333; the split was eight for liberal, 15 for restricted access. 
136 ILC Proceedings 1966, above n 119. See especially 199-207 debate on supplementary 
means. 
137 Villiger, above n 127, 332. 
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draw on the insights of the schools if they wish. The extent to which this has 
occurred, and whether it has resolved anything about the nature of the law or its 
underpinnings, is examined in sections IV and V. 
W ATTITUDES TO TREATY INTERPRETATION FROM 1969 
Whatever the intentions of the drafters, or the delegates at the conference, 
articles 31 and 32 have usually been taken to require either the textual, or a 
closely related contextual approach. State practice, academic writings, and to a 
lesser extent arbitral and judicial decisions tend to confirm this as the majority, 
but not the only, view. Given this background, the attitude of the majority in the 
ICJ in the 1990' s examined in section V below, is not surprising, but is rather a 
further step in an emerging predominance of textualism. Whether this is 
predominance should be confirmed must be returned to later. 
A State Practice 
In the period following the Vienna Conference it is possible to detect conflicting 
views on the basis for interpretation. The articles were already being referred to 
I ' S 
as reflecting custom, ., or being treated as declaratory of principles of 
international law.
139 On the law' s content, some governments stressed the 
importance of intentions.
140 However, more prevalent was the view that the 
articles embodied textuality.
141 The United Kingdom courts have sometimes 
consciously adopted a teleological, or what they call the "European" approach, 
and have been arguably slow to recognise the convention rules.
142 Nevertheless, 
it is easy to agree with Villiger that many states, by the 1980s, regarded the 
138 Villiger, above n 127, 334, position of Austrian Government. 
139 Villiger, above n 127, 335, position of Federal Republic of Germany; 335, position of
 
Sweden. 
140 Villiger, above n 127, 334, 335 for instance Germany and Belgium. 
141 Villiger, above n 127, 336, position of UK Government in the Golder case in 1975. A
s well 
as the United Kingdom, Villiger identifies Austria, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherla
nds, South 
Africa, Switzerland, and even the United States as exhibiting at least some agreement
 that the 
textual approach predominates. 
142 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines ( 1980) ll All ER 696; James Buchanan case ( 1977) I All 
ER 
518; See Villiger above note 127, 337; see also R Gardiner "Treaty Interpretation in th
e English 
Courts since Fothergill v Monarch Airlines" ( 1995) 44 ICLQ 620. 
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articles as declaratory, and considered they embodied the textual approach. 143 
The approach of the ILC appears eroded, in that article 31 (1) alone appears often 
to be taken to be the "general rule", not the totality of article 31, and access to 
supplementary means is taken to be restrictive. 144 No doubt state practice is not 
sufficiently uniform or widespread to amount to subsequent practice under 
article 31(3)(b), but paradoxically, it may amount to supplementary evidence 
admissible under article 32. Of course, states adopting a textual reading of the 
articles may consider such evidence as unnecessary and inadmissible, if they 
consider the articles meaning is "clear". 
B Courts and Arbitral Tribunals 
Courts and tribunals have been more ambivalent about the basis for treaty 
interpretation, at least until the ICJ in the 1990s. There was willingness to apply 
article 31 ' s general rule even before its ratification, as representing "generally 
accepted principles of international law", 145 or "traditional canons". 146 
However, different tribunals and judges have taken quite different approaches to 
what the articles require, indicating no early consensus on their meaning. The 
European Court of Human Rights in Golder appeared to be adopting exactly the 
expressed reasoning of the ILC, that the general rule defines "the process of 
interpretation as a unity, a single combined operation", with all the elements of 
the article on an equal footing. 147 While this suggests that the Court was 
adopting the implicit compromise between text and other means of 
interpretation proposed by the ILC, Fitzmaurice and Verdross at the time, 148 and 
Sinclair later149 were highly critical of the departure from an available ordinary 
meaning in favour of something incompatible with it. While the disagreement 
appears to be a principled one based on the different perspectives of textualists 
and those prepared to adopt a more teleological approach, there is no doubt 
143 Villiger, above n 127, 337, para 499. 
144 Villiger, above n 127, 337, para 499. 
145 Golder Case 57 ILR 213-214 para 29. See discussion in Sinclair above n 13, 131-133. 
146 Beagle Channel Arbitration (1979) 52 ILR 124 para 7(d)(i); Villiger, above n 127, 339, para 
503. 
147 Golder above n 145 para 30. 
148 Golder above n 145,245, dissenting opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice; 224 dissenting 
opinion of Verdross. 
149 See Sinclair above n 145. 
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some plausibility in Sinclair' s description of the Court' s adherence to the 
articles as "lip service", 
150 and Fitzmaurice's accusation that the Court was in 
fact using the articles to confirm an interpretation reached by other means.
151 
That the dispute was possible emphasises the breadth of the articles, the lack of 
true consensus in their development, and the scope for ongoing divergence on 
their interpretation. 
Some early arbitral decisions do however suggest a more consistently textual 
approach. The Beagle Channel Arbitration, involving the interpretation of an 
1881 boundary treaty between Argentina and Chile, was resolved on a textual 
analysis of ''the more natural [meaning] on the basis of the actual language of 
the text." 152 The Arbitral Tribunal in the Young Loan Arbitration actually 
applied the articles, moving from unclear text to context and objects and 
purposes, and on to preparatory works to resolve the question of what amounted 
to a "depreciation".
153 However, as Villiger has pointed out, the panel may only 
have moved on to other means, because the text could not resolve the issue.
154 
The case does not stand for any clear acceptance of parity of means, even within 
article 31. 
The attitude of the I CJ to the articles during the 1970s and into the 80s seems at 
most ambivalent. McDougall has criticised the Court for being overwhelmingly 
textual in its approach, 
155 while noting some exceptions from individual judges, 
such as Judges de Castro and Dillard in the Namibia Advisory Opinion. 
156 
While McDougall' s view is undoubtedly coloured by his view of the articles 
themselves, there is evidence of textual analysis in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Case, 157 and in some of the separate opinions in the WHO Advisory Opinion.
158 
150 Sinclair, above n 13, 131. 
15 1 Golder above n 148, 247 per Fitzmaurice. 
152 Beagle Channel above n 146, 145, para 48. 
153 Young Loan Arbitration 59 ILR 495, 530-543. 
154 Villiger, above n 127, 341. 
155 McDougall, above n 7, xlii-xlv. 
156 McDougall above n 7, xii ii, xiv; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970) (1971) ICJ 16, 182, per separate opinion of Judge de Castro; 157 separate opinion of 
Judge Dillard. 
157 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK/Iceland) (Jurisdiction) ( 1973) ICJ 9 para 17. 
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However, in a much quoted paragraph from the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the 
Court is "[m]indful ... of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in 
accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion". 159 
While the phrase is used in connection with settling a question of intertemporal 
law as it affects interpretation, 160 it does suggest the Court still gave credence to 
the view that the primary object of interpretation is to establish intentions. The 
wording contains no hint of Huber's stipulation, that that intention is to found in 
the expressed text. 
It can be inferred the Court was inclined to avoid difficult questions of 
interpretation, especially where they tended to divide the Court. Thus, in the 
WHO Advisory Opinion, the Court redefined the question to be answered, 
thereby avoiding having to resolve the key issue of whether "revision" could 
include "termination". 161 The Court was divided on the merits of purely textual 
interpretation, with at least three judges seeing the need to avoid ''formalism", 
and to resolve the issue by reference to preparatory works. 162 Thus, while a 
textual approach often appeared in the jurisprudence of the Court, it remained 
contested, and it was not until the 1990s that the Court felt able or obliged to 
state an approach based on primacy of text, formally linked to articles 31 and 
32. 
C Academic Writers 
Modem academic writing usually either argues or assumes that the articles 
encapsulate a textual or contextual basis and approach. This is :frequently true of 
writers who clearly disagree with such an approach. Thus, McDougall fought 
against the textuality of the articles on the Vienna Conference floor, 163 and later 
held that the Vienna Convention "chose text as the primary focus of attention for 
158 WHO Advisory Opinion ( 1980) ICJ 73, 128 separate opinion of Judge Mosler; I 85, separate 
opinion of Judge Sette-Camara; McDougall xlii-xliii. 
159 Namibia above n 156, 31 para 53. 
160 Namibia above n 156 see para 53. 
161 WHO Advisory Opinion above n 158, para 42; Sinclair, above n 13, 123. 
162 Sinclair, above n 13, 124. Judges Gros, Ago and EI-Erian saw the limits to the textual or 
semantic arguments, and resorted to preparatory works; contrast Judges Mosler and Sette-
Camara, above n 158. 
163 Text of McDougall's argument to the conference, (1968) 62 AJIL 1021. 
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the task it describes as "interpretation"''.
164 Similarly Haraszti, clearly an 
advocate of the ''fullest possible enforcement of the intention of the parties" 
considered the Convention "rests in principle on Vattel's thesis", albeit with 
some concessions, such as recourse to subsequent practice and special 
meanings. 165 Yambrusic, too, appears to accept that what the ILC drafted was 
based on an ill-considered acceptance of the primacy of the text.
166 
Writing shortly after the agreement of the articles at the Vienna Conference, 
Jacobs is far more sympathetic towards textualism.
167 Jacobs observed that the 
articles appear basically hierarchical, with ordinary meaning and therefore the 
text coming first ( despite ILC protestations to the contrary). 
168 He takes this, 
and the Commission's nomination of text as the starting point as pointing to a 
textual approach. 
It is obvious from section III above that the ILC's deliberations are capable of a 
quite different interpretation from that just suggested. Jacobs does in fact 
consider there is some divergence from the text by the articles however. He 
detects elements of incipient teleology, especially in the wide allowance of 
subsequent practice.
169 Jacobs sees this as a major departure, as it opens the 
door to interpretation based on subsequent intentions, not merely the intentions 
of the parties at time of conclusion. 
170 The inclusion of an unlimited reference 
to object and purpose is also seen as a move towards teleology.
17 1 
Overall, Jacobs appears to be arguing the approach is or should be textual, but is 
also warning of what he sees as some teleological "dangers" in the text. He uses 
a largely textual approach himself to identify the articles' content, and to 
identify any traps for the unwary which may lie in that text. 
164 McDougall, above n 7, xl. 
165 Haraszti, above n 15, 102-103. 
166 Yambrusic, above n 9, 186. 
167 Jacobs, above n 24, 318, 342-343 . 
168 Jacobs, above n 24, 326. See discussion above section III, for ILC's view on hierarchy. 
169 Jacobs, above n 24, 327-329. 
170 Jacobs, above n 24, 329. 
171 Jacobs, above n 24, 337-338. 
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Sinclair also appears to favour ordinary meaning. 172 His position, and his view 
on the content of the articles seems closest to the kind of contextual synthesis 
proposed by McNair, to which Sinclair refers. 173 Text in context, and in the 
light of object and purpose gathered from the text, are the basis of 
interpretation. 174 The interpreter can and will have access at various times to all 
the potential sources and methods available within the articles, but must have 
regard to their respective weights, or place in a hierarchy. 175 If this seems well 
removed from the advertent intention of the ILC, it nevertheless can be said to 
represent an "orthodox" position, more recently reflected in the ICJ. 
Standing out against such an orthodoxy is the position of Villiger. He makes 
use both of the text of the articles, and the proceedings of the ILC to argue for a 
more permissive approach. Ordinary meaning is both relative, and multiple, as 
article 31 itself implies. 176 All of the elements within article 31 are of 
potentially equal value for interpretation, and this was the explicit intention of 
the ILC as expounded in the "crucible" analogy. 177 The parties to a dispute are 
intended to have liberal recourse to supplementary means, because they can be 
used at any time to confirm, or where there is ambiguity, which will be frequent 
or prevalent. 178 The articles therefore provided a highly flexible range of 
possibilities, which nevertheless governments and courts have tended not to use, 
sticking to inappropriately narrow textualism. 179 
Apart from implicitly criticising the over-reliance on textualism, Villiger does 
not however choose between the schools, or argue that the articles adopt one 
school. 180 While he clearly considers elements of all three main schools are 
present in the articles, he does not identify a clear basis for interpretation, or 
have anything to say on the purpose. This is unfortunate if unsurprising, given 
172 See for instance his criticism of the majority in Golder, above n 145. 
173 Sinclair, above n 13, 115 and n8. 
174 Sinclair, above n 13, 118. 
175 Sinclair, above n 13, 154. 
176 Villiger, above n 127, 343 para 51 2. 
177 Villiger, above n 127, 344, para 513; 345 para 516. 
178 Villiger, above n 127, 346 para 518. 
179 Villiger, above n 127, 345 para 516. 
180 Although reference to "object and purpose" does permit teleology, and preparatory works etc 
are there to shed light on intentions: Villiger, above n 127, 343, para 513; 345 para 517. 
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that his primary purpose when considering the articles is to examine an example 
of divergence between treaty law and emerging custom.
181 It will be argued in 
the remaining two sections that disagreement on purpose is what continues to 
impede progress in our understanding of interpretation, and this critical issue 
needs to be addressed if any resolution is to be attempted. 
V THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND INTERPRETATION IN 
THE90s 
By the early 1990s therefore, there was increasingly widespread agreement that 
articles 31 and 32 represented both the conventional and customary law on 
treaty interpretation. This usually but not universally accompanied a view that 
the articles demanded primarily a textual approach, with other means of 
interpretation available but subordinate to the text of a treaty and the ordinary 
meaning. As will be seen from analysis of the cases, the ICJ finally adopted this 
orthodox approach, but not without critical dissents which drive us back to 
consider the basis of treaty interpretation. 
A Libya v Chad 
1 Background 
The Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) 
(Libya v Chad) came before the ICJ in 1990, based on a Framework Agreement 
("Accord-Cadre") between the parties of 1989.
182 It concerned in the opinion of 
Chad a boundary dispute over an existing but disputed border between the 
countries, and in the opinion of Libya, a question of the extent of Libya's 
territorial rights to the south, as Libya contended there was no existing 
conventional boundary in the affected area.
183 Chad relied mainly on a 
boundary argued to have been detennined by the Treaty of Friendship and Good 
Neighbourliness, between the United Kingdom of Libya and France in 1955 (the 
181 Villiger, above n 127, 342 paras 508-510. His analysis is one case study in his larger work on 
the relationship between treaty and customary law. 
182 Libya v Chad above n 3, 8-9 para 1. 
183 Libya v Chad above n 3, 12-14 para 17. 
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1955 Treaty), 1833 although it did also argue in the alternative that the border 
could also be determined by reference to earlier treaties, if the Court did not 
accept its interpretation of the 1955 Treaty. 184 Libya on the other harid 
interpreted the treaty as not agreeing or determining the frontier in the affected 
area, but only confirming other :frontiers which had already been agreed, such 
as that between Libya and Tunisia, to Libya's west.185 
2 The issue 
The dispute therefore turned on interpretation of the 1955 Treaty, and in 
particular its article 3 and the relevant annexe 1. The authoritative French text 
reads: 186 
Les deux Haute Parties contractantes reconnaissent que Jes frontieres separant 
Jes territoires de la Tunisie, de I' Algerie, de I' Afrique occidentale fran9aise et 
de I' Afrique equatoriale fran9aise d'une part, du territoire de la Libye d'autre 
part, sont celles qui resultent des actes internationaux en vigueur a la date de la 
constitution du Royaume Uni de Libye, tels qu' ils sont de:finis dans l' echange 
de lettres ci-jointes ( annexe I) 
The Court did in fact determine the matter on the basis of its interpretation of the 
treaty, in favour of the Chad interpretation, that the 1955 Treaty did indeed set 
all the frontiers, including between Libya and what is now Chad.187 This is not 
surprising: the text of the treaty is relatively straightforward, and is supported 
by the context of other articles in the treaty, which also suggest that it was an 
object of the treaty to set the frontier. 188 The conclusion is also supported by 
reference to preparatory works, and by reference to the subsequent attitudes of 
the parties to their mutual frontier. 189 
1833 France was the then colonial power responsible for the area which became the State of Chad, 
on independence in 1960. 
184 Libya v Chad above n 3, 15, para 21. 
185 Libya v Chad above n 3, 22 para 43 . 
186 Libya v Chad above n 3, 20-21 para 39. Translation by the ICJ Registry is included in 
English text of the case. The annexe lists several agreements between the various colonial 
powers at the beginning of the 20th century defining spheres of influence and frontiers. The 
critical ones for this dispute are the Franco-British Convention of 1898 (and an 1899 Declaration 
completing it), and the decisive Franco-British Convention of 1919. 
187 Libya v Chad above n 3, 22-28 paras 42-56; 40 para 77, finding (I). 
188 Libya v Chad above n 3, see paras 45-51 on the text of the treaty; para 52 re object and 
purpose; paras 53-54 re context. 
189 Libya v Chad above n 3, 27-28 paras 56-57 re preparatory works; 34-37 paras 66-71 re 
subsequent attitudes. 
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3 The Court's approach to interpretation 
More interesting is the approach which the Court took to interpretation. It finally 
and explicitly confirmed article 31 as mandatory, because it reflected customary 
international law. 190 However, it cited only paragraph 1 of the article, stated that 
"[i]nterpretation must be based above all on the text of the treaty", and agreed 
that preparatory works and circumstances of conclusion were potential 
supplementary means.
191 The Court was therefore not only accepting the 
general consensus on the articles' status as custom but was also adopting the 
specifically textualist reading. "Above all on the text" is surely more than the 
text as the logical "starting point", and the apparent limitation to only article 
31 (1) is a denial of the "crucible" of means in a unitary process. Not only does 
this exclude means in paragraphs 2 to 4 intended to be equally important in the 
mix, it leads as well to a narrowly textual application of the means in paragraph 
one. This can be demonstrated by reference to the Court's own process of 
interpretation in this case. 
The Court rejects the Libyan interpretation, that article 3 intended only to 
recognise frontiers already fixed by the previous instruments, as contrary to the 
"natural and ordinary meaning of the words. 
192 While the Libyan contention is 
hard to defend, so too is this easy reliance on "natural meaning". The Court no 
doubt felt they were dealing with an easy case, but to revert to locating "natural" 
meanings is arguably to resort to fictions. 
With respect to object and purpose, it is clear that the Court is limiting itself to 
locating these from the text of the treaty: one is to "read the 1955 Treaty in the 
light of its object and purpose".
193 While this is certainly one important way to 
discern purpose, it begs the question of whether it is permissible to look 
elsewhere, to clarify purpose. The Court seems to be implicitly accepting that it 
is not. 
190 Libya v Chad above n 3, 21 para 41. 
191 Libya v Chad above n 3, 22 para 41. 
192 Libya v Chad above n 3, 22 para 43. 
193 Libya v Chad above n 3, 25 para 52. 
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The Court does several times refer to the intention of the parties. 194 However it 
is clear that the Court is restricting itself to the Huber formula: it is the 
"manifest intention", and "the text [which] . . . conveys the intention". 195 
Intention, as with the related concept of purpose is relevant to the extent it can 
be located in the text. 
Much of the interpretation analysis concentrates on matters of grammar and 
semantics: for instance, the meaning and implications of "recognise", the 
significance of reference to "frontiers", not "the frontier", and the meaning of 
"en vigueur". 196 This was probably in part a response to the arguments put to it, 
especially by Libya, 197 and is in any case inevitable to some extent, given that 
the words of the text and their relationships to each other are the logical starting 
point. However, it can be inferred that the Court was comfortable with this as 
their principal tool of interpretation, and optimistic about its sufficiency. In this 
case it no doubt was, but its limitations could easily be exposed in more 
difficult cases. 198 
The treatment allotted to subsequent practice is illuminating. The Court does 
not deal with this as a means of interpretation in its primary interpretation of the 
treaty, or indeed until after it has identified the boundary arising from the 
annexed conventions. While it details a series of agreements after 1955 and 
other statements and actions, this is done as an apparently confirmatory analysis 
of "subsequent attitudes", not practice. 199 While this may have been due to the 
way the case was argued, or because the Court did not consider the practice 
came within the definition in article 31 (3 )(b ), the possibility is not even raised. 
This again suggests the text trumps other means, even those placed on a par with 
them, by article 31. 
194 Libya v Chad above n 3, see for instance 24 para 48; 25 para 51. 
195 Above n 194. Emphasis added. 
196 Libya v Chad above n 3, 22 para 42; 23 para 46; 24 para 49. 
197 Above n 196. 
198 See discussion of Qatar v Bahrain below. 
199 Libya v Chad above n 3, 34fpara 66. 
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4 Separate opinion of Judge Ajibola 
The narrow textual approach of the majority is in contrast to the more wide-
ranging interpretation provided by Judge Ajibola. While Judge Ajibola 
considers the majority "dealt adequately" with the interpretation of article 3,200 
he adds a considerably more detailed analysis, highlighting the equal importance 
of "actual object and purpose",201 the possibility of an "integration approach" 
which may help reveal the intentions of the parties, 202 and the relevance of 
subsequent practice.203 While Judge Ajibola does not come to any different 
conclusions from the majority, and also seeks to ground his approach in the 
provisions of articles 31 and 32,204 he demonstrates that it is not necessary or 
advisable to stop at the text. This once again confirms the ambiguity of the 
articles. His approach is closer to the crucible advocated by the ILC and further 
suggests that the textual approach of the Court's judgment will have its 
limitations when it faces more difficult problems. 
5 Summary: a wrong turn? 
It 1s unfortunate that the Court chose to define its position on treaty 
interpretation and the content of articles 31 and 32 in such a straightforward 
case. The relative ease with which mainly textual analysis resolves the issue in 
the present case masks that this will not always be so. By adopting the textual 
approach as mandatory the Court has developed the law without fully testing its 
implications. It will be seen in the case of Qatar v Bahrain that too-ready 
reliance on textual analysis can not only lead to inappropriate conclusions, but 
may also serve as a shield or device, to provide a basis for an interpretation 
arguably arrived at by other means, or for other reasons. 
200 Libya v Chad above n 3, 62 para 43, separate opinion of Judge Ajibola (Ajibola). 
201 Ajibola, above n 200, 62 para 44; 62-66. 
202 Ajibola, above n 200, 66-71. The intentions are not being explored directly, but may be 
revealed by an integrated analysis. The difference between this approach and an examination of 
the supplementary means, which he does not think is necessary in this case, is not made clear by 
his Excellency. 
203 Ajibola, above n 200, 74-77. 
204 Ajibola, above n 200, 62 para 44; 72 paras 88 and 89. 
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B Qatar v Bahrain 1995 
1 Background 
The Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between 
Qatar and Bahrain had its roots long before 1971, when the two states gained 
full independence. 204a The subject matter concerned land on the Qatar peninsula 
(Zubarah) claimed by Bahrain, islands off the coast of Qatar held by Bahrain 
and claimed by Qatar (Hawar Islands and Janan Island), various low tide 
elevations in the sea between the two states, and the maritime boundaries, once 
all the territorial claims had been settled.205 The Court released its judgment on 
the substantive case in April 2001,206 which is of no special interest for treaty 
interpretation. The case relevant here is the 1995 Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
decision, 207 which turned on a contentious interpretation issue relating to the 
"international agreements" between Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (as neutral 
mediator) which aimed at settling the dispute by submitting the whole of it to the 
ICJ. The relevant agreements consisted of identical letters sent by the King of 
Saudi Arabia in December 1987 to each party, and the so-called "Doha 
Minutes" of December 1990. The first "agreement" put in train negotiations to 
conclude a Special Agreement for submission to the Court, which had stalled by 
late 1988.208 The Doha Minutes, the record of a meeting in Doha attended by 
the parties and the King of Saudi Arabia and signed by the parties, agreed 
critically in paragraph 2:209 
The good offices of ... King Fahd ... shall continue ... to May 1991. Once that 
period has elapsed the two parties [alternatively "the parties"] may submit the 
matter to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the Bahraini 
formula, which has been accepted by Qatar, and with the procedures consequent 
on it. The good offices of ... Saudi Arabia will continue during the period the 
matter is under arbitration." 
204
a From their former status as areas under the "protection" of Great Britain. 
205 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v. Bahrain) 2001 ICJ paras 1-34 available at www.icj-cij.org/wwwicj/ 
docket/iqb/iqbframe.htm. (Qatar v Bahrain 2001). 
206 Qatar v Bahrain 2001 above n 205. 
207 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3. 
208 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3 16 para 29. 
209 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 17 para 30. 
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2 The issue in 1995 
The critical question for the 1995 case became, did this provision entitle one 
party to unilaterally refer the dispute to the Court, after May 1991 , or would 
there still need to be either a special agreement or separate but identical 
applications'r 1 ° 
Qatar took the former view, and submitted an application in July 1991. The 
Court found in July 1994 that the 1987 and 1990 agreements did together 
constitute international agreements creating binding obligations, by which the 
parties had undertaken to submit the dispute to the Court. However, as there 
was as yet only one application, the Court would give the parties opportunity to 
submit to it "the whole of the dispute".2 11 In the event the parties could not 
agree on how to do this, and Qatar once again made its own application, which 
was duly challenged by Bahrain.212 
3 The reasoning of the majority 
Thus the Court, having once given the parties another chance to resolve the 
jurisdiction and seisin issue, was forced to decide whether, based on the earlier 
agreements it had found, Qatar could in fact unilaterally seise the Court. It 
found by a majority of 10 to 5 that it could, based on the interpretation it gave to 
the critical paragraph 2. It stated that it reached this conclusion "based on the 
ordinary meaning to be given to [the Minute' s] terms in their context and in the 
light of the object and purpose of the said Minutes.21 3 The Court was clearly 
once again adopting its minimalist, textual version of Article 31. Examination 
of the Court' s reasoning shows it overwhelmingly textual, of questionable logic, 
and inappropriate given the evidence. 
210 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 18 para 32. 
211 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 9 para 9. 
2 12 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 9-10 paras 12-13. The apparent difference between the parties 
was how to describe elements of the main dispute: Bahrain insisted on the disputes over 
Zubarah and the Hawar Islands being described as "claims of sovereignty''. In its application 
Qatar merely noted that this was how Bahrain defined its claim over Zubarah. 
213 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 21 para 40. 
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The Court began by quoting its summary of the required approach to 
interpretation from Libya v Chad.214 It then looked at the critical expression 
"al-tarafan "("the parties or ''the two parties"). It acknowledged the ambiguity, 
over whether this implied joint or unilateral referral, and sought to resolve it by 
reference to the context in which it was used.215 Context is however to be used 
cautiously; the Court refers to the "more immediate" and "more remote" 
context, and clearly prefers the former. 216 
The Court relies on the fact that ''the two parties may submit. .. ". It holds that 
"may" implies, in its most ordinary or natural sense "a possibility or even a 
right", which therefore suggests an option or right to seise the Court, and to be 
able to do this unilaterally.217 This is an enormous leap in logic. While "may" 
does suggest possibility rather than obligation, there is nothing in the word or its 
use to suggest that rights attach severally. It is surely more "natural" to read the 
words to say that the two parties may submit their case together, or to accept at 
the very least that the word may does not clarify one way or the other, whether 
either can or both must. The Court already appears to be drawing unwarranted 
conclusions from the language used, which are even more dubious when related 
to the preparatory works, discussed below. 
The Court bolsters its conclusion by reference to the phrase "once that period 
had elapsed", suggesting that the "right" was capable of being exercised as soon 
as the required five months of mediation had elapsed, which necessarily, for the 
Court implied the right had to be to unilateral seisin, to be effective.218 This is 
an invocation of the principle of effectiveness, and is driven by the Court's view 
of the object and purpose of the Doha Minutes: the advancement of the 
settlement of the dispute by facilitating its referral to the Court.219 This is 
problematic, as Lauterpacht has shown, 220 as it need not be assumed that the 
214 Libya v Chad above n 3, 21-22 para 41; Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 18 para 33. 
215 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 18-19 paras 34-36. 
216 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 18 para 34. Even the surrounding paragraphs 1 and 3 are seen as 
"remote". 
217 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 18-19 para 35. 
218 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 19 para 35. 
219 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 19 para 35. 
220 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 74. 
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parties, or their agreement had as their object, referral at any cost or by any 
means. The principle allows treaties to have appropriate effects, and given the 
long and difficult negotiating history, where both parties jealously guarded their 
positions on procedural as well as substantive matters, it is hard to accept that 
the parties now anticipated unilateral seisin, in the absence of agreement on the 
issues. The Court is arguably assuming an object and purpose which provides 
for the greatest effect by the treaty, not necessarily the most appropriate. If the 
purpose is read less ambitiously, the phrase "once the period has elapsed" does 
nothing to strengthen any implication of unilateral seisin, but rather merely 
highlights that no seisin was possible before the new period had expired. While 
apparently attempting to read words in context, the Court is in reality in danger 
of amending the treaty. 
The Court also relies on the "good offices" provision to reinforce its analysis. It 
suggests that, as the words might suggest that the intended good offices could 
not begin again, after the five months, until the matter was in arbitration, and it 
would be undesirable ("contrary to purpose") to have this mediation suspended, 
there must have been provision for immediate and unilateral seisin. 221 The 
Court appears to recognise this argument is weak, as it stresses that, even if it is 
wrong on the implications for mediation of the final sentence in paragraph 2, its 
earlier reasoning still holds.222 While the reasoning here does not therefore 
carry much weight, it can be seen in any case that it rests again on the purpose 
assumed by the Court. In any case, it can be argued from the developments in 
interpretation discussed in section VI below that this is the sort of situation 
where a court may need to recognise that wrong or infelicitous language has 
been used, and therefore be slow to accept an implication that may flow from 
such words.223 The wording therefore does not support the Court's conclusion. 
To make its conclusion work, the Court has to read down the reference to the 
"Bahraini formula ... and with the procedures consequent on it". On its face, 
paragraph 2 indicates any referral must be in accordance with the formula. 
221 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, I 9 para 36. 
222 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 20 para 36. 
223 See section VI below, especially Lord Hoffman ' s principles, principle IV. 
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Arguably, given the context in which the formula was developed in 1988 and the 
words of its preamble, this would imply joint referral. Such an implication is 
strengthened by the "and the procedures consequent" stipulation - if the formula 
anticipated or required joint referral, that would be the procedure required as 
consequent on it.224 The Court dealt with this problem for its conclusion by 
effectively reading the formula as being used in 1990 to define only the subject 
matter of the dispute. It justified this by suggesting the formula needed to be 
understood in its 1990 context - as a way of settling the subject matter - rather 
than in its 1988 context.225 It therefore managed to suggest that only procedural 
consequences that survived the change of context were relevant - not the 
procedural consequences anticipated in 1988 as a result of the formula. 226 
The logical and inferential leaps of this reasoning are breathtaking. No evidence 
- from the text or anywhere else - is presented to support the contention that 
only the subject matter was being invoked, and the arguable counter-indications 
in the text are ignored.227 The Court appears prepared to do violence to textual 
analysis, to preserve an interpretation which it favours. While the Court will not 
consider it is doing so, as it clearly considers it has arrived at the ordinary and 
"clear" meaning of the text, the situation does show the inherent limitations of 
the textual approach as a method, and therefore as the purpose of interpretation: 
the text is at best ambiguous or contradictory, if viewed from the Court' s 
perspective, and cannot be a complete answer to the interpretation question -
even with the aid of treaty purpose, inferred from the text. 
The interpretation is in fact so tenuous that it suggests the Court may have 
merely been using textual devices to achieve an end it saw as desirable for other 
reasons, just as Lauterpacht had suggested Courts could and did, when applying 
"rules".228 It can be argued here that what the Court is achieving is what it sees 
as the equitable and desirable result, despite the difficulties with interpretation: 
desirable as it should help to move toward settlement an intractable dispute 
224 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 20 para 37. 
225 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 20 para 38. 
226 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 21 para 39. 
227 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 20 para 38. 
228 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 53. 
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which has the potential for violence; equitable because while it allows Qatar to 
achieve unilateral seisin, it does so in a format which broadly meets apparent 
Bahraini concerns over subject matter, and allows the Court to specifically state 
that the remaining concerns, specifically claims of sovereignty, will fall within 
the dispute.229 While there is no direct appeal to equity, it is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that the Court felt it was achieving a "fair" result, and that its 
approach to interpretation could support that. 230 The willingness to go to the fair 
result points to the conceptual poverty of the majority's approach to 
interpretation, which is drawn out in the dissenting opinions discussed below, 
and will be commented on further in section VI. 
Despite all the interpretative difficulties it has picked its way through, the Court 
considers that it has arrived at a satisfactory ordinary meaning in terms of article 
31 ( 1 ), and that therefore reference to supplementary means is therefore strictly 
unnecessary. 231 Although it goes on to consider preparatory works, to help 
confirm its conclusions,232 the Court's position implies a very narrow view of 
the role of such means. The Court apparently considers that, despite the evident 
ambiguity, it has been resolved and the meaning is not left "ambiguous or 
obscure"233 , meaning reference is not required. It would seem far better, and in 
keeping with a reasonable textual approach, to have recognised that while the 
Court preferred one meaning, ambiguity remained, and other sources could and 
should be used to resolve it. 
The Court ' s treatment of the preparatory works is unconvmcmg and 
misconceived. It approaches them with caution because of their "fragmentary" 
nature,234 but does note the crucial fact that an earlier draft of paragraph 2 
provided "either of the two parties", but that this was removed at the insistence 
229 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 25 paras 47-48. 
230 This is arguably the opposite to the conclusion of Judge Ajibola, Libya v Chad above n 3, 
separate opinion, 59 para 29, that equity has no role to play when a treaty decides a matter. 
23 1 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 21 para 40. 
232 The Court was no doubt aware that the minority judges would have much to say about the 
preparatory works and their significance, making discussion of them practically unavoidable, 
even if they regarded this as theoretically unnecessary. 
233 Article 32(a). 
234 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 21 para 40. 
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of Bahrain.235 While noting this earlier version would clearly have provided for 
unilateral seisin, the Court argued that its removal does not demonstrate the 
opposite conclusion.236 While this may be arguable from a strictly logical 
viewpoint, it is surely contrary to a textual approach to argue that a change in 
wording does not mean something. Even more importantly, given that 
preparatory works are used to establish the intention of the parties when it is not 
otherwise evident,237 it must be concluded that, either the parties did not agree or 
commonly intend unilateral seisin, or at least that Bahrain did not so intend, and 
at the very least Qatar ought to have known this. The requirement for 
interpretation in good faith should surely mean that Qatar could not rely on its 
"interpretation". Alternatively, it will be argued in the final section, this change 
should be taken to indicate, either that the parties had agreed a "special 
meaning" for al -tarafan, or that the "objective" intention of the parties was that 
unilateral seisin be excluded. Whichever method is adopted, it is submitted that 
the Court's failure to give any weight at all is unsustainable. 
4 Dissenting opinions 
Not surprisingly, the Court's judgment was subject to vigorous dissent. Not all 
of the five dissenters concentrated on the interpretation weaknesses.238 
However, Judge Shahabuddeen pointed out the weakness of the Court' s reading 
down of the reference to the Bahraini formula, 239 and he and others pointed to 
the real difficulties with the Court' s analysis of the preparatory works, and the 
earlier version of "either of the parties".240 Interestingly, Judge Shahabuddeen 
was prepared to say the meaning of the text was "clear",241 on the basis of his 
reading of the reference to the formula. This demonstrates the unavoidable 
shortcoming of the textual approach: different readers will often arrive at quite 
235 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 22 para 40. 
236 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 22 para 40. 
237 See Third Waldock Report, above n 5; Fitzmaurice' s principle IV Fitzmaurice 1957, above n 
17, 211. 
238 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 40-50, per dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, who relied mainly 
on criticisms of the Courts approach to jurisdiction, and the doubtful nature of what he referred 
to as the "agreements" . 
239 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 56, dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
240 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 56-58, dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen; 34-37, 
dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel; 69, dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma; 76, dissenting 
opinion of Judge ad hoe Valticos. 
241 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 56, dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
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different, often directly opposed but allegedly "clear" mearungs. Surely the 
better position is to accept that "clear" meanings are too :frequently illusory, and 
that it will be better to accept the prevalence of ambiguity, and use all available 
means find what can often only be the "most likely" or "most appropriate" 
meaning in the circumstances. 
It is not altogether clear that the dissenting judges all want to severely qualify 
the textual approach of the majority, although all are prepared to use a wider 
range of means to resolve the central ambiguity. Vice President Schwebel 
however goes much further, and brings the debate back to the fundamental issue 
of the true basis or purpose of interpretation.. He first refers to Lord McNair to 
establish that the ultimate goal is to give effect to the intention of the parties, 
that is, in Schwebel' s words ''the common intention of both parties".
242 He then 
refers to numerous passages from the ILC proceedings to demonstrate the 
importance of establishing intentions, and the utility of preparatory works for 
doing so.243 He also points out that no-one in the case had even questioned the 
resort to preparatory works, or criticised them as ":fragmentary, inconclusive, or 
otherwise open to discounting or disregard".2
44 His central point is that all 
methods of interpretation, including textual analysis, should have as their central 
aim the finding of and giving effect to actual joint intentions. Nothing which 
assists in this should be neglected, and limitations which get in the way of it are 
inappropriate. In drawing so heavily on the ILC, he also appears to be implicitly 
assuming that this approach is consistent with articles 31 and 32. 
It is significant that for Schwebel, it is enough that examination of the 
preparatory works demonstrates that unilateral seisin cannot have been a 
"common" intention.245 This shows the object of the Minutes cannot have been 
to allow unilateral seisin, as there could be no such purpose without common 
intention. The Court' s interpretation therefore falls outside the Vienna 
242 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 27 dissenting opinion of Vice President Schwebel (Schwebel); 
McNair, above n 1, 366. 
243 Schwebel, above n 242, 28-32. 
244 Schwebel, above n 242, 32. 
245 Schwebel, above n 242, 35. 
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Convention rules, as it cannot be "in good faith". 246 Thus, the analysis helps to 
demonstrate that the intentions of the parties can be relevant, even where they 
are not common, at least in a negative way. While this does not completely 
remove the objection to the intentions school, that giving effect to intentions 
often means making them up, it does confirm that actual common intentions 
should be decisive, and that even where they are absent, an understanding of 
what intentions there are can still be of assistance. The scope for re-integrating 
intentions back into the process of interpretation will be discussed further in 
section VI. 
5 Summary 
Qatar v Bahrain not only demonstrates limitations and dangers in the regime for 
interpretation espoused in Libya v Chad: it also suggests some lines of enquiry 
to effect corrections. It is likely that such corrections will include establishing a 
clearer and agreed basis for interpretation, and allowing the appropriate 
recognition of the intentions of the parties, whether common or divergent. It is 
submitted that such corrections are far more likely to provide certainty in 
interpretation, than the approach of the majority in this case, which can best be 
described as arbitrary. 
C Kasikili/Sedudu Island: Interpretation in Action? 
Reference to the recent Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Botswana/Namibia/47 shows that the ICJ continues to struggle to find a 
common position on how to interpret treaties, due at least in part to a too easy 
acceptance after Libya v Chad of textualism. The tensions evident in approach 
in Qatar v Bahrain are repeated in Kasikili Island, and it can be argued that 
over-reliance on the textual approach leads the majority to what is in effect an 
unnecessarily detailed and inappropriate attempt at interpretation. 248 It is 
246 Schwebel, above n 242, 36. 
247 Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) ICJ 1999, available at 
http://wwv,·.icj .law.gla.ac.uk/icjwww/idocket/ibona/ibonaframe.htm, last accessed 24 May 2001 , 
(Kasikili Island). 
248 Kasikili Island above n 3, paras 18-80. The analysis, in an attempt to find a meaning for the 
text in question, is exhaustive but arguably misconceived. See discussion of Judge Higgins 
view, below 47-48. 
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submitted the textual approach and assumptions are getting m the way of 
effective interpretation, and need to be modified. 
1 Background 
The Kasikili/Sedudu Island dispute arose between Botswana and Namibia, and 
concerned their common border at the Chobe River and the legal status of 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island which lay in the river, bounded by a northern and 
southern channel. The boundaries in the area had been determined by an 1890 
Treaty between Germany and Great Britain, which amongst other things sought 
to delimit each colonial power's spheres of influence in southern Africa. Both 
powers were interested in access to the Zambezi, and to that end the sphere for 
German Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia) included a 20 mile wide strip 
(the "Caprivi Strip") running across the top of Bechuanaland/Botswana to the 
Zambezi. It was thought the Chobe River might actually allow navigation to the 
Zambezi, and so the parties provided in Article III for a boundary that: 
"runs eastward ... till it reaches the river Cho be, and descends the centre of the 
main channel of that river to its junction with the Zambesi where it 
terminates".249 The German version of the key words in the Treaty clause was: 
"der Thalweg des Hauptlaufes dieses Flusses".250 
2 Majority judgment's approach 
The critical issue for the majority in the case, and to a lesser extent the minority 
judges and those of the majority appending separate declarations, became the 
meaning of "centre of the main channel/Thalweg des Hauptlaufes", and 
therefore which of the two channels round the island was the "main" one. 
The majority judgment goes into great detail, trying to determine what it sees as 
an interpretation issue. 251 It begins by quoting paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 31, 
and reaffirming the article's customary law status. 252 As the judgment later also 
quotes and applies article 31 (3) regarding subsequent agreements and 
249 Kasikili Island above n 3, para 21. Emphasis added. 
25° Kasikili Island above n 3, para 21. 
251 Kasikili Island above n 3, paras 18-80. 
252 Kasikili Island above n 3, para 18. 
47 
practice,253 the judgment may be somewhere nearer the ILC's "crucible". 
However the judgment again quotes the salient passage from Libya v Chad, once 
again establishing the primary importance of the textual enquiry. The task is to 
find the ordinary meaning of "main channel", which must be presumed to have a 
precise meaning.254 The Court concludes that correct interpretation shows the 
northern is the main channe~ as it has the "line of deepest soundings" and is thus 
the "Thalweg".255 The Court has, by its view, arrived at an or rather the ordinary 
meaning, which it finds has not been overturned by subsequent practice. 
Given that the Court also considers object and purpose,256 and, rather briefly, 
preparatory works, 257 it can be said that the Court is trying to give fuller effect to 
all the interpretative means at its disposal, even if it starts from the textual 
necessity of finding the ordinary meaning. However it is submitted the textual 
emphasis enshrined since Libya v Chad still leads the Court to miss the point. 
Even though it is conceded that the Treaty offers no criteria or definition for 
establishing "main channel,258 the primacy of the text approach leads the Court 
to the unnecessary conclusion that "main channel" has a precise meaning which 
can be elucidated by interpretation. This seems an example of the Court 
confusing the processes of interpretation and application, as McDougall has 
suggested the textualist is prone to. 259 It would be far simpler and more sensible 
for the Court to accept the limited but clear meaning of "main channel", 
reflecting that the parties intended to divide the territory based on whichever of 
multiple channels turned out to be the main one. This should be an exercise in 
factual application of a treaty, not an attempt to find a meaning that was never 
there. 
253 Kasikili Island above n 3, para 48. 
254 Kasikili Island above n 3, para 27. 
255 Kasikili Island above n 3, para 89. 
256 Kasikili Island above n 3, paras 43-45 . 
257 Kasikili Island above n 3, para 46. 
258 Kasikili Island above n 3, para 21 . 
259 McDougall, above n 7; and above, 13-14. 
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3 Other approaches 
By contrast, Judge Higgins concludes with the majority for the northern channel, 
but not by a process of interpretation. She reaches her conclusion by applying 
the general term from 1890, based on today's knowledge. What matters is the 
"broad intentions" of the parties, in the light of today' s knowledge.
260 Her 
approach not only recognises the "fanciful" nature of what the majority 
judgment attempts:261 it is also a fair attempt to reveal then give effect to the 
intentions of the parties. By not asking interpretation to do what it cannot - that 
is, find an ordinary meaning when there is none - this approach is far more 
likely to arrive at an appropriate result, based on a very simple interpretation, 
and then a careful application of it. 
Judge Oda, also part of the majority, is of the view that this is not a case 
involving interpretation under the Vienna Convention.
262 While noting the 
Convention article' s customary law status, he does not accept that the articles 
apply to a treaty concluded in 1890, to which neither of the current states were 
party.263 In any event he considers that the issues are to be resolved by 
application of the 1890 Treaty, in the light of today's hydrological knowledge, 
and the past practice between the parties - not as an interpretive aid to the 1890 
treaty, but as decisive on where the border was located, in its own right.
264 
Thus, while taking a somewhat different route to judge Higgins' conclusion, 
Judge Oda seeks to engage in an application of the treaty, and the resolution of a 
boundary dispute, for which extensive "ordinary meaning" analysis is 
unrewarding. 
Vice President Weeramantry dissented from the majority conclusion, and found 
that the southern channel represented the main and therefore border channel. He 
began from the premise that this is a matter of interpretation, and that 
consideration of an "ordinary meaning" or relevant technical or scientific 
meaning is the starting point. However, as there is considerable doubt, he feels 
260 Kasiki/i Island above n 3, per Judge Higgins separate declaration paras 3-4. 
26 1 Kasiki/i Island above n 3, para per Judge Higgins separate declaration para I . 
262 Kasikili Island above n 3 per separate opinion of Judge Oda, paras 4-5. 
263 Kasikili Island above n 3 per separate opinion of Judge Oda, para:4· 
264 Kasiki/i Island above n 3 per separate opinion of Judge Oda, para 32 and para 63 . 
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able to use other methods of interpretation, including especially subsequent 
practice. While he is then more liberal in his use of practice than the majority, 
he at least on the surface is applying a hierarchical approach to interpretation. 
Given the ambiguity, he is able to arrive at the opposite conclusion to the 
majority.265 He also allows at least the possibility of equity affecting the 
interpretation result, although in this case he is able to give effect to equity, 
without affecting the interpretation he prefers. 266 
Judge Fleischhauer also dissented. He agreed that this was an interpretation 
case, and that the Vienna Convention is relevant as customary law. He however 
gave far more weight to "object and purpose", which he appears to equate to the 
intentions of the parties - a· more "nuanced basis to considering why the parties 
• used particular words. "267 His approach is perhaps the least restrictive, as he is 
prepared to consider even mistaken assumptions of the parties, for instance 
about the navigability of the river, as relevant to establishing intention, and 
therefore the result. 268 His approach in any case supports Judge Schwebel' s 
contentions in Qatar v Bahrain, and suggests that reliance "above all on the 
text" is still a contestable position. 
4 Lessons and issues from Kasikili Island 
It 1s not at all clear from this case that there is one accepted approach to 
interpretation. It is possible to agree with Stone269 and Lauterpacht270 that the 
Court is using the supposed law regarding interpretation to justify the 
conclusions it has come to on other bases. In any case, the approaches adopted 
run from a closely textual approach, to a realisation that this is not even a case 
requiring interpretation, but rather application, to an object/purpose/intentions 
approach, to allowing in considerations of equity. There is little point in 
265 Kasikili Island above n 3 per Vice President Weerarnantry, paras 7-14. 
266 Kasikili Island above n 3 per Vice President Weerarnantry, paras 91-93. 
267 Kasikili Island above n 3 per Judge Fleischhauer, para 2. "The fuller quotation reads: "what 
the Court is asked is rather to explore the intention of the Parties, the reason why they used the 
particular term, and to proceed on that more nuanced basis." 
268 Kasikili Island above n 3 per Judge Fleischhauer, para 9. 
269 Stone, above n 10, 363-364. 
270 Lauterpacht 1949, above n 29, 53 . 
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accepting articles 31 and 32 as custom, when there is no consensus on their 
content. 
D The Current Position 
The review of the above three recent cases shows that the majority of the 
International Court has accepted a primarily textual approach and reading of 
articles 31 and 32. While this was uncontroversial in Libya v Chad, it led to an 
overly semantic, logically untenable interpretation in Qatar v Bahrain. In 
Kasikili Island the Court at least attempted to apply more of the whole of the 
articles, but in assuming textual supremacy it tended to do so in a hierarchical 
way, rather than in the unified process anticipated by the ILC. Even more 
importantly, the textual presumption led the Court to look for an ordinary 
meaning that was not there. The textual approach led the Court to attempt a 
pointless legal enquiry, to find a fictional and unnecessary "interpretation", 
when all that was required was a factual enquiry, to enable the application of a 
straightforward provision whose meaning and intent was relatively "clear", if 
limited. 
Critiques of the overly-textual approach survive in all three judgments. It is 
submitted that these are not merely the rationalisations of minorities seeking to 
justify different conclusions.271 They stem from a more fundamental 
disagreement over the purpose and approach to interpretation, which argues that 
the so-called "subjective" intentions of the parties, or better, their actual 
intentions should be determinative, at least where they can accurately (that is 
objectively) be determined. As this disagreement seems likely to continue, it is 
now timely to see whether the opposing approaches can be integrated to form a 
more viable process. Modern thinking about the approach to contract 
interpretation can help show one possible solution. 
27 1 In Libya v Chad and Kasikili Island at least, much of the critique comes from Judges who 
agree on the answer, but not the process. 
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VI THE MODERN THEORY OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, 
AND TREATIES 
It is permissible and sensible to look to commercial contract law for answers on 
this subject. While the subject matter of treaties and commercial contracts are 
vastly different, they are both laid on the same foundation of consensual 
agreement to be bound to legal obligations. Given the consensual basis of all 
International Law, and especially of Treaty Law, it is logical to look to a parallel 
system equally based on voluntary assumption of obligations requiring a 
meeting of minds. Furthermore, it is evident that the law of treaty interpretation 
has frequently "borrow[ed] ... from the private law of contract".272 This has 
usually been to gather logical maxims and tools of interpretation, such as 
ejusdem generis or a contrario, whose status as legal rules, as opposed to logical 
guides has long been doubted. 273 Indeed, the ILC confirmed that such maxims 
are not legal rules.274 However, this does not destroy the power of the analogy. 
Contract law would no doubt agree with international, that these are useful 
guides, not rules of law. More importantly, if contract law has faced the same 
controversies, over the dominance of "plain meaning", and the relative weight 
and admissibility of different types of evidence, 275 and has found better ways to 
resolve them, then it is surely sensible for interpreters of treaties to see what can 
be transmitted from interpretation of contracts. 
A The Plain Meaning Rule and Emerging Ideas 
Anglo-Saxon, and especially British Commonwealth, contract law has 
traditionally held to a "Plain Meaning Rule" of contract interpretation. The 
parallels with the classic textual position in treaty interpretation can be seen in a 
New Zealand expression of the rule:276 
[W]here words or a clause or indeed a contract as a whole have a clear 
objectively ascertainable meaning on the face of the document, then that is the 
272 McNair, above n 8, 364. 
273 McNair above n 8, 364-366; see also Haraszti, above n 22. 
274 Waldock Third Report, above n 5, 54 para 6; ILC Commentary 1964, above n 4, 200 para 5. 
275 See generally McLauchlan, above n 28, for both background on the contract interpretation 
debates, and his proposed resolution. 
276 Benjamin Developments Ltdv Robert Jones (Pacific) Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 189,207 per Gallen 
J (CA). 
52 
meaning which the parties will be held to have intended and to which they shall 
be bound .... On the other hand where a word or a clause or indeed a whole 
contract is ambiguous or the result of a literal construction gives rise objectively 
to ambiguity or absurdity then the authorities allow the true intention to be 
elucidated by the admission of evidence directed to that end. 
Thus, while as with treaties under the textual approach, the intentions of the 
parties are theoretically important, a "clear", "plain" or "ordinary" meaning in 
the context of the contract, may give rise to an unrebuttable presumption that 
that is what the parties intended, and any diverging actual intention is irrelevant. 
In this strict form, extrinsic evidence may not be admitted to demonstrate the 
ambiguity or absurdity, if it is not apparent on the face. 277 
Such a stem view is usually justified by its defenders on the basis of certainty, 
the need for objectivity, and reasons of convenience or expedience.278 Such 
arguments have drawn criticism when used in defence of textualism in treaty 
interpretation, and the Plain Meaning Rule has been subject to vigorous 
academic criticism, 279 and judicial retreat, to the extent that it can probably no 
longer be said to represent the law in the United Kingdom or New Zealand.280 
What then do the critics contend? 
Professor McLauchlan bases his critique on a more realistic understanding of the 
uncertainty of language, the narrow scope and lack of legal quality in the so-
called parol evidence rule, and a more cautious approach to the objective theory 
of contract.281 While the parol evidence rule, which states that recourse to 
extrinsic evidence is impermissible if it would contradict, add to or vary an 
277 Benjamin Developments above n 277, 203 per Hardie Boys J. 
278 Masport Ltd v Morrison Industries Ltd (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Wellington, CA 
362/92, 31 August 1993) per Cooke P; B & B Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltdv Cheeseman and 
Assocs Pty Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 227,234 per Kirby P; see also McLauchlan, above n 28, 98-
99. 
279 McLauchlan, above n 28; see also Corbin on Contracts (1 st rev ed, St Paul, West 
Publishing, 1960) vol 3 eh 24 and Corbin "The Interpretation of Words and the Paro) Evidence 
Rule" ( 1965) 50 Cornell LQ 161, which McLauchlan refers to extensively. 
280 Investors Compensation Scheme v W Bromwich Building Society [1998) l WLR 896, 
especially Lord Hoffinann, 906ff (HL) (!CS); Boat Park v Hutchinson [1999) 2 NZLR 74; but 
Note Melanesian Mission Trust Board v AMP Society [ 1997) I NZLR 391 (PC), which arguably 
preserves the plain meaning approach adopted in Benjamin Developments. 
281 McLauchlan, above n 28, 81 . 
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apparently complete written contract,282 can be treated as peculiar to contract 
law, and never part of the International Law of Treaties,283 the other two 
factors can be seen as highly relevant to interpretation of treaties. 
Professor McLauchlan asserts, with Corbin, 0 W Holmes and others284, that it is 
a mistake to regard words as having "fixed" or "natural" meaning, but rather 
they are given meaning by the hearer or reader, or by the speaker or writer.285 It 
follows that it is possible, indeed desirable, to select the meaning the parties 
actually attached to the words used, or where they attached different meanings, 
that meaning which was held by one party and known to the other, rather than 
the apparently "plain" but different meaning contained in a document. 286 This is 
not to deny that words and phrases will often have apparently plain or ordinary 
meanings. Where they do, this will be strong, but not conclusive evidence that 
this was the meaning adopted by the parties. But where there is convincing 
evidence that the parties actually meant something else, why should a court hold 
them to a meaning that neither intended?287 In treaty terms, such would be 
contrary to pacta sunt servanda and good faith. 
Professor McLauchlan further points out that the Plain Meaning Rule can be 
seen to be supported by a misapprehension of the objective theory of contract. 
He points out that even the classic common law formulation of the objective 
principle of contract formation288 allows a subjective element: while one will 
usually be held to a bargain if one' s conduct would lead a reasonable person in 
the shoes of the other party to believe that one assented to be bound, this does 
not apply unless the other party did in fact so believe. 289 McLauchlan argues 
that similar principles should apply to interpretation, as apply to formation. It 
282 McLauchlan, above n 28, 87; see also McLauchlan "The Admissibility of Paro! Evidence to 
Interpret Written Contracts" (1974) 6 NZULR 12 1. 
283 See for instance Vienna Convention article 31(3), re subsequent agreement or practice, which 
must be regarded as extrinsic evidence. 
284 McLauchlan, above n 28, 84. 
285 This insight clearly goes further than the recognition, even by the textualists of the ILC, that 
words only have ordinary meaning in context. It shows that the apparent meaning, even in 
context may not be the actual meaning, thus undermining the purely textual approach. 
286 McLauchlan, above n 28, 85. 
287 McLauchlan, above n 28, 87. 
288 Smith v Hughes (1871) ILR 6 QB 597, 607. 
289 McLauchlan, above n 28, 92. 
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simply makes no sense, if a party can escape a contract for lack of agreement, 
based on an actual (subjective) understanding of a party, to then hold that the 
actual understandings of the parties are irrelevant to solving the same issue, 
framed as a dispute over interpretation. 290 
The need to move away from a too ready acceptance of a "plain" meaning has 
been recognised by the courts, in particular in the shape of five principles 
developed by Lord Hoffinan in the ICS case.291 The principles hold that it is 
always appropriate to consider all the relevant background, when seeking to 
arrive, objectively, at the meaning of a document, that is, whether or not there is 
any apparent ambiguity. The relevant background is very widely defined, 
except for Lord Hoffinan it still does not include the negotiations of the parties, 
or their declarations of subjective intent. It is important that the focus be on 
documents, not words: in some cases the background may actually establish 
that, for some reason, the parties used the wrong words or syntax. The plain 
meaning rule is therefore reduced to an evidentiary presumption, that we do not 
lightly accept that parties have made linguistic mistakes, or that for some other 
reason, the apparent meaning is not in fact the meaning of the parties.292 
The Hoffinan principles establish the first part of Professor McLauchlan's 
thesis, that an apparently plain meaning is rebuttable by other evidence. They 
continue to rely on an objective theory however, that objective not actual 
intentions of the parties are what is being sought.293 As Professor McLauchlan 
has pointed out, 294 such reluctance is not reflected outside the British 
Commonwealth. The American Restatement provides for interpretation 
according to the actual common intention, or where intentions diverge, the 
intention of one party when the other party knew or ought to have known of 
290 McLauchlan, above n 28, 96; see also David McLauchlan "A Contract Contradiction" (1999) 
30 VUWLR 175, 182-183 . 
29 1 !CS above n 281 . 
292 !CS above n 281, 912-913 . The principles were adopted, in shortened form, by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in Boat Park, above n 28 l. 
293 Although doubt is cast upon this restriction by more recent cases which accept the parties' 
subsequent conduct as evidence: see Attorney General v Drew: Holdings (1996) TCLR 617; D 
McLauchlan "Subsequent Conduct and Contract Interpretation: An Update" (1997) 3 NZBLQ 
147. 
294 McLauchlan, above n 28, 97-98. 
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it. 295 This position is also adopted in the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 296 and in the Unidroit Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, effectively a restatement of the 
commercial contract law of the world.297 The common sense position, that we 
should interpret in accordance with the actual intentions of the parties when we 
know them, and not limit our resources when trying to establish such intention, 
is therefore increasingly widely accepted on an international level, at least in 
respect of contracts. This begs the question, why a similar approach should not 
apply with treaties, where the emphasis on consent of the parties is arguably 
even stronger. 
Before moving to look at possible implications for treaty law, it should be 
pointed out that this position is not in reality a retreat to subjectivity. While that 
which is being referred to can be described as the "subjective intentions of the 
parties", it is just as easily and more accurately described as their "actual 
intentions".298 Any alleged actual intention has to be subject to objective 
evidence. Interpreters do not need to delve into "unfathomable depths of 
subjective intentions". 299 Rather they will need to consider what reliable 
evidence ( more than mere assertion) is available to point to intention. It can be 
said that the label "subjective" is more an epithet useful to cast doubt on a 
necessary enquiry, than it is a statement of any real objection. 
B Implications/or Treaty Interpretation: A Synthesis? 
It must be admitted that the law of treaty interpretation has not been quite so 
restrictive as the strict form of the Plain Meaning Rule, described above, at least 
since the codification of articles 31 and 32. Article 31 not only allows, but 
according to the ILC requires resort to extrinsic evidence, through paragraph 
295 Restatement (second) of the Law of Contract (St Paul Minn, American law Institute, 1981 ) 
§ 201. 
296 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Doc ( 1987) 52 
No 40 US Federal Register 6262, 6266, Article 8. 
297 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994) articles 4.1-4.3 ; 
McLauchlan above n 28, 98; Perillo "Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review'' (1994) 63 Fordham L Rev 281 , 283. 
298 McLauchlan, above n 28, 93 . 
299 B & B Constructions above n 279. 
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31(3) and presumably paragraph (4).300 It is clear from the ILC Commentary 
and article 31 itself that the primary recourse to subsequent practice is limited to 
concordant practice. Such recourse cannot logically be denied, as it represents a 
consensual agreement of the law. 301 However the provision at least avoids the 
blanket ban which the Plain Meaning Rule imposes, and confirms that in this 
fact situation at least the actual intentions of the parties - what they agreed -
should be decisive. It is notable that the Court, in Kasikili Island clearly felt 
obliged to examine subsequent practice, even though it considered it had found 
the ordinary meaning. 302 The unavoidable inference is that common intentions 
can and should be decisive, even potentially when they may appear to contradict 
an apparent "ordinary meaning". Similarly, while the ILC considered resort to a 
special meaning was likely to be rare, and the textualists argued that the special 
meaning would or should appear as the ordinary meaning from the text or 
context, 303 it was recognised by others that it would be impossible to establish 
special meanings without recourse to extrinsic means. 304 The decision to keep 
the "special meaning" provision in article 31 , rather than placing it as a 
subordinate or supplementary article, or deleting it altogether, implies an 
acceptance that an actual common agreement on meaning should be 
determinative, when it can be proven. Thus article 31 is not a strict plain 
meaning rule, despite the apparent attitude of the Court, in Libya v Chad, and 
Qatar v Bahrain. 
Despite this potential permissiveness, treaty interpretation can still learn and 
adopt much from the emerging modem understanding of the basis of contract 
interpretation. The old contest between text and intentions can be resolved, not 
by enshrining one view or the other, but by according each its appropriate place. 
Treaty interpretation should no longer be seen as a field of battle between two 
main but opposing schools of thought, but rather as an area of broad enquiry, 
where insights from the schools can be brought into harmony, so that each 
300 ILC Commentary 1966, above n 4, 220 para 8. 
30 1 
ILC Commentary 1966, above n 4, 222 para 15; article 31(3)(b). Non-concordant practice is 
merely another type of supplementary means, to which there may or may not be recourse. 
302 Kasikili Island above n 3, paras 53ff. 
303 ILC Proceedings 1966, above n 119, 98, para 3, per Sir Humphrey Waldock. 
304 ILC Proceedings 1966, above n 119, 205 para 24, per Mr Ago. 
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supports an ultimate goal, of more certain interpretations which are most likely 
to be in accordance with the will of the parties. 
It is submitted that we should accept that the goal or object of treaty 
interpretation, is to give effect to the intentions of the parties. 305 This means 
that, while we can still accept Judge Huber's precept,306 at least as a rebuttable 
presumption of fact, an apparently plain or ordinary meaning will merely be 
strong evidence that that is the meaning the parties intended. 307 If however 
some other evidence offers convincing proof that the actual intention of the 
parties requires a different meaning or result, then that meaning should be 
preferred, in accordance with the basic purpose, and to comply with 
considerations of good faith. Thus, the text remains the starting point but not 
necessarily the determinant of analysis. 
This approach may in some circumstances lead to a special meaning in terms of 
article 31(4), but it will be wider than that limited or special case. For instance, 
it may be necessary or possible to give a word or phrase a particular 
interpretation, to accord with the known overall actual intention of the parties, 
even though the parties never turned their mind to the meaning of the particular 
words, or how they should be interpreted in a new, previously unforeseen 
situation. There will no doubt continue to be numerous situations where the 
ascertainable intentions of the parties add nothing, or are irrelevant because the 
parties have simply not turned their minds to the possibility which has 
subsequently arisen, and this case is dealt with below. 3o7a However, the 
intentions of the parties may still in some cases cast light, at least by inference, 
on how an unforeseen problem or circumstance should be approached, and it 
would once again be contrary to good faith to ignore any such insight. 
There will also be the situation highlighted by Lord Hoffinan, where the parties 
had a clear intention, but inadvertently used wrong or misleading words or 
305 In one sense this contention is not even controversial: the textualist merely translates it to 
presume that intention is normally as expressed in the text. 
306 See above 4 n 12. 
307 See Lord Hoffinan ' s principle 5, JCS, above n 281 , 913 E. 
307
c See below 59. 
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syntax. 308 An example of such a situation is provided in Qatar v Bahrain, and 
gives the answer to the majority's somewhat strained attempt to support its main 
reasoning by reference to the words relating to the continuation of Saudi 
Arabia' s "good offices".308a It is surely an unwarranted inference, to insist on a 
literal interpretation of some ancillary but poorly worded or conceived phrase, 
thus affecting the interpretation of more central treaty provisions, when it is 
clear from the context or other clues that the parties' intentions were quite 
contrary to such an interpretation. Arguably, Lord Hoffinan' s recognition that 
we sometimes do not have to, or cannot give a meaning or a consistent 
interpretation to every word used, is the key to unlocking overly formalistic 
approaches to interpretation, and thus arriving at the most appropriate 
understanding of a treaty. Finally, It may often be a case of choosing between 
two or more potential meanings, each of which could be the "ordinary 
meaning", based on which better fulfils the intentions of the parties. Once 
again, this can be argued to be the situation the Court faced (but attacked rather 
differently) in Qatar v Bahrain, when dealing with al-tarafan, and the related 
words.308b 
In some circumstances it may be clear that, while it cannot be established that 
both parties shared the same intention, one party intended a particular meaning, 
and this intention was known to the other. Following the contract principles, 
this meaning should be taken to be the objective intention of the parties. If only 
by silence, a party may have reasonably led the other to believe that their 
meaning was accepted, and should not later be able to argue a different meaning. 
It might be argued this approach diverges somewhat from the consensual basis 
of international law: one party's intended meaning is being favoured, not the 
meaning consensually agreed between the two. However it is submitted that 
such a response is in fact both permissible and required. To allow a party to 
resile from a meaning they can be argued to have tacitly accepted, or at least by 
omission encouraged another party to believe they accepted, would not only be 
contrary to the objective theory, in contract terms, but would also be contrary to 
308 /CS, above n 281 , 913 D, principle 4. 
308
a Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 19, para 36. See discussion of majority's reasoning above 40. 308
b Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 18-19. See above 3 8-40. 
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the obligation of good faith, in treaty terms. Such a result would be destructive 
of pacta sunt servanda, and encourages exactly the kind of unreasonable result 
reached in Qatar v Bahrain. 308c In any case, there is surely a good evidentiary 
case accepting that a party accepts or agrees to a meaning placed on a provision 
by another party, if they know the meaning which is being ascribed, and take no 
action to dispute it. At the very least this is strong objective evidence that such a 
known meaning is in fact the one intended by the parties. 
If no common intention can be established, for any of the five reasons given by 
Lauterpacht, 309 then it is submitted the most reasonable meaning based on all the 
circumstances should be chosen. In such a situation, the words of the text, in 
context, may in fact be all that the interpreter has to work with, and in any case 
will carry very strong evidentiary value. Given the large number of cases, 
where parties simply will not have turned their mind to an issue, or where new 
circumstances arise, and common intentions which are known cast no light, this 
may well remain the most common situation. The above approach however 
simply adds to this normal situation, that the interpreter should not ignore the 
actual or objective (as opposed to implied or presumed) intentions of the parties, 
where these are available or can be ascertained by enquiry. Just because a 
textual or contextual enquiry will sometimes, even often, be all that is 
realistically available to the interpreter, is no justification for ignoring other or 
stronger evidence of the will of the parties, where it is available. 
The natural corollary of this approach is that no potential source of evidence 
should be excluded if it will provide proof of intentions and therefore the 
parties' meaning. The relative weight of different types of evidence will still 
need to be considered, and it will of course take clear contradictory evidence to 
overturn an apparently clear meaning. 
It must be emphasised that the approach just suggested above is not the 
replacement of the textual approach with the intentions of the parties school. It 
3osc See n 311 below. 
309 See above 11, and n 51. 
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does not require or allow resort to "implied intentions", to fill every gap left in 
the actual intentions of the parties. Where common or objective intention is not 
ascertainable, there is no benefit in choosing a meaning, and then attributing that 
as the supposed intention of the parties. It is surely far better to recognise that 
intention can only go so far, and that where it does not assist, we should look for 
the most reasonable interpretation. 
C Merits of the Proposed Approach 
It is submitted that the above approach is more consistent with the basic 
principles of pacta sunt servanda, and interpretation in good faith, than either 
the textual or the thorough-going intentions approach. It seems beyond 
argument that good faith requires us to choose an interpretation which we know 
represents the will of the parties, over one which can be justified only by a 
purely linguistic analysis as an ordinary meaning. Similarly, the limitations on 
intentions, to prevent them being created by the interpreter to - fill gaps, 
reinforces the focus on the treaty itself - and the will of the parties - rather than 
on the mind of the interpreter. 
This approach should help avoid at least some arbitrary or unjustified 
interpretations, and assist interpreters to arrive more readily at agreed 
interpretations. Reference to the three cases discussed in section V is 
instructive. In Libya v Chad, the above approach would probably have made no 
difference to the result. The textual and extrinsic evidence both led to the same 
conclusion, that is that the parties did intend to fix the border, and did so 
according to the 1919 Franco-British Agreement.310 By contrast, it is submitted 
that it would have been impossible for the majority to reach the same conclusion 
in Qatar v Bahrain. Given the evidence of the preparatory works, it would 
surely have been difficult to avoid the conclusion either that the parties did share 
a common intention, that unilateral seisin was not permitted, or alternatively that 
Bahrain held such a view, which must have been obvious to Qatar when it 
3 10 Libya v Chad above n 3, 26-27, paras 55-56. 
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agreed to the revised wording.3 11 The Court would arguably have been 
prevented or at least discouraged from adopting a strained and unconvincing 
semantic analysis, to justify the conclusion it apparently wished to arrive at, and 
Qatar would have been precluded in good faith from maintaining the 
interpretation which the majority ultimately accepted. 
The situation in Kasikili Island is less clear. A closer focus on the intentions of 
the parties may have led the remainder of the majority to conclude with Judge 
Higgins that the parties had no specific intentions on the point in issue, that the 
basic text was clear as far as it went, and that therefore they should apply it as 
fairly as possible, based on today' s knowledge.312 Alternatively, one could 
agree with Judge Fleischhauer that something of the intentions of the parties 
could be discerned from their attitudes to the navigability of the river, and this 
should affect the interpretative result.313 In the end, the persuasiveness of Judge 
Fleischhauer' s argument will depend on the view one takes of whether the 
evidence establishes what he contends for about object, purpose or intentions. 
Nevertheless, it is contended that a check for any actual intentions would not 
have hindered, and could readily have assisted the Court to arrive at either the 
correct approach based on intentions, or the most reasonable result, in their 
absence. At the very least, a clearer focus on the intentions of the parties may 
have helped the Court to avoid the presumption that there was some detailed and 
specific ordinary meaning waiting to be discovered, and therefore also to avoid 
what was arguably a pointless search for something which never existed. 
The above brief survey suggests that the approach suggested can make a useful 
contribution to courts' and tribunal's interpretative efforts. Judges will be less 
tempted or able to use textual analysis to achieve interpretations seen as 
desirable for other reasons. Also, given the prevalence of ambiguity recognised 
by the modem contract-based approach, judges will not be forced to resort to 
devices, merely to justify use of evidence they consider relevant. The current 
311 Qatar v Bahrain above n 3, 35, dissenting opinion of Vice-President Schwebel; compare 21 -
23 para 41 , judgment of the Court. 
312 Kasikili Island above n 3, see separate declaration of Judge Higgins. 
3 13 Kasikili Island above n 3, dissenting opinion of Judge Fleischhauer. 
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frequent or habitual recourse to preparatory works314 will be regularised, by both 
the need to check for evidence of actual intentions, and the admission that 
ambiguity is the norm. 
As an ancillary benefit, we can speculate that a closer approximation between 
the processes of contract and treaty interpretation will bring us closer to a more 
coherent general understanding of how legal documents are to be interpreted. 
While it is not surprising that different areas of law have developed different 
rules, the law will be more comprehensible and defensible, if common issues are 
tackled in consistent ways. 
Against these logical and procedural advantages, it could be argued that any 
change would be at the price of certainty.3 15 Location of actual intentions may 
be seen to be more difficult, less certain and less predictable than merely reading 
a text. Against this, it has been pointed out above, and Qatar v Bahrain 
confirms, that text can be at least as slippery as intentions, and just as open to 
abuse. Arguably, if an actual intention can be located, then the interpretation is 
the most certain of all those possible. Given that fictions such as "presumed" or 
"implied" intention are eschewed, there is nothing to suggest that the modern 
contract approach is any less certain than that which it would modify. The 
opposite is more likely to be the case. 
Policy arguments of convenience and efficiency have been raised against the 
modern contract approach. It is submitted with Professor McLauchlan,316 that 
these are unconvincing. In international cases, the reality is that recourse to 
preparatory works is normal. 3 17 If resort to preparatory works is inevitable, then 
adoption of the modern contract approach will make their use more rational, and 
is hardly likely to require significant further time or resource than is already 
expended. If the enquiry is more focused, on seeking to reveal what the parties 
intended, rather than simply hunting for evidence which might somehow help to 
314 See R Gardiner "Treaties and Treaty Materials: Role, Relevance and Accessibility" (1997) 46 
ICLQ 643. 
3 15 See Jacobs, above n 24, 342-343. 
316 McLauchlan, above n 28, 98-100. 
317 Gardiner, above n 314. 
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support an interpretation favoured by one party or another, then disputes may 
actually be resolved more efficiently. In any case, every time resort to the most 
appropriate or convincing evidence leads to an interpretation reflecting the 
actual intention of the parties, a more effective - and therefore more efficient in 
the long run - result should be achieved. The modem contract or "actual 
intentions" approach should promote efficiency, not impede it. 
All of the above suggests that the proposed approach is logical, more likely to 
promote appropriate results, and is likely to be as efficient as the current textual 
orthodoxy. One crucial criticism which must however be addressed, is whether 
such an approach is permissible within the law provided by articles 31 and 32. 
There is little point advocating a system, if it would require revision of the 
treaty - surely an unlikely event. Is the proposed approach consistent with the 
Convention provisions? 
D The Modern Contract Approach and Articles 31 and 32 
The first point to note is that the articles are silent on the purpose or basis of 
treaty interpretation. As was argued above, this may well be because the 
drafters chose to leave the matter, to avoid the at that time irresolvable doctrinal 
conflicts. 3 18 As this implies an absence of common intention, the purpose 
proposed should be permissible - that is, not proscribed - so long as it is 
consistent with what is provided in the articles and is the most reasonable 
purpose. It is surely unreasonable to suggest that treaty interpretation has or 
needs no purpose, meaning that some purpose must be able to be inferred. 
It is submitted that the requirement for interpretation in good faith favours the 
purpose and approach argued for. Not to give effect to the will of the parties, 
when it is known or knowable, cuts across good faith. It is difficult to envisage 
any other purpose - for instance such as to give effect to or elucidate the 
meaning of the text -which is able to satisfy the good faith requirement. 
318 See above, 21 and 23 . 
64 
Although intention is mentioned only in one paragraph,
3 19 it can be seen as 
inherent in both the concept of object and purpose,
320 and is the reason for 
'21 
reference to preparatory works in the first place:' Further, the relevance of the 
intentions of the parties is confirmed, both in article 31(3)(a) and (b), and in 
31 ( 4). Paragraph 4 is particularly compelling of the view that an established 
actual intention takes precedence. All the modern contract insights are adding 
therefore, is a logical extension or conclusion, showing the importance or 
determinative quality of intentions, where they can be established. The articles 
already accept, as did their drafters, that the intentions of the parties are relevant. 
It is therefore the task of the interpreter to discover intentions when this is 
possible, and therefore to give effect to them. 
It must be recalled that the ILC intended the process of interpretation to be a 
unity, with all methods thrown in the crucible.322 Such an approach is far more 
consistent with giving preference to actual common intention, than it is with 
insisting on the primacy of text, especially when several of the elements rely on, 
or seek to locate, an actual intention. In fact, the explicit denial of any 
hierarchy, and the relegation of the text to the "starting point",323 confirms that 
text and ordinary meaning are one of several means to an end, not the end itself. 
The most appropriate conclusion is that article 31 is consistent with, where 
possible, finding the actual intention of the parties. 
It is true that article 32 appears to relegate preparatory works to a subordinate 
position, apparently inconsistent with using the widest possible means to arrive 
at actual intention. It is clear however the ILC in fact intended wide or liberal 
recourse to the "supplementary means".324 Given the purpose of such access, to 
provide insight into intentions, the scheme of article 32 therefore also supports 
interpretation according to the actual common intention of the parties. 
319 Article31(4). 
320 Sinclair, above n 13, 130. But note Sinclair's own contrary view. 
32 1 Waldock Third Report, above n 5, 58 para 20. 
322 See above, 22. 
323 See above, 22. 
324 ILC Commentary 1966, above n 4, 220 para 10 especially explicit reference to use of works 
to "confirm" a meaning. 
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It is submitted that, as the articles were themselves originally a complex 
compromise, the proposed "actual or objective intentions, otherwise the most 
reasonable interpretation" approach is both consistent with the articles, and a 
better reflection of them than a reading which emphasises the primacy of the 
text or ordinary meaning. The proposed approach gives both intentions and the 
words of the text their proper weight in resolving interpretations, with each 
likely to be determinative in different circumstances. This in itself is a 
compromise, but one which is consistent with both the text and the intentions of 
the drafters, as far as they went, and is also logically defensible, and likely to 
lead to reasonable results. 
E Summary: A New Way Forward? 
The above analysis suggests that there are no impediments, and clear 
advantages, to adopting the insights to be gained from the modern contract 
approach to interpretation. While the approach suggested can fairly be said to 
be rather different from the textualist orthodoxy which has emerged in recent 
years regarding treaty interpretation, it does not deny the importance of text, is 
arguably close to and consistent with the original intentions of the drafters, and 
is far more likely to resolve arguments over interpretation which clearly still 
persist, at least at World Court level. It is to be hoped that continuing and 
widening acceptance of this modern contract approach can come to influence the 
approach which jurists and practitioners will take to treaty interpretation in the 
future. 
VII CONCLUSION 
It would seem that treaty interpretation has continued to be a source of 
controversy, because we have not been able to agree on what purpose 
interpretation is meant to serve. The majority of writers, diplomats and judges 
have been content to accept an apparently workable compromise, in the form of 
articles 31 and 32, and have been prepared also to assume that these impose a 
basically textual and hierarchical process on interpreters, albeit one which 
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contains considerable flexibility, and scope to the individual interpreter. 
However, as different interpreters continue to hold quite different views about 
the basic purpose of what they are doing, it is hardly surprising they often arrive 
at quite different results. It has been submitted in this essay that this divergence 
of views remains unsatisfactory, and can lead courts and other interpreters to 
inappropriate and incoherent results. It is further argued that difficulties will 
persist, if the nettle which was not grasped by the ILC continues to be ignored. 
It has been argued that contract law can point us in the right direction, to give 
appropriate prominence to the actual or objective intentions of treaty parties, 
wherever they can be discovered, thus accepting that discovering and giving 
effect to the will of the parties should be at the heart of treaty interpretation and 
treaty law. While it can and has been argued that such an approach is in fact 
consistent with and implicit in articles 31 and 32 themselves, it is evident that 
we need an appropriate stimulus to lead us to this necessary conclusion. 
Whether such stimulus comes from contract insights, or from within 
international law itself, it is clear that interpretation will continue to be 
unpredictable, sometimes arbitrary, and often controversial, if this matter is not 
resolved. If articles 31 and 32 are to be more than devices in the hands of the 
interpreter who seeks to achieve a given or pre-determined result, we must be 
prepared to answer the "purpose" question, in favour of the actual intentions of 
the parties. 
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